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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “But why, some say, the moon? Why choose this as our goal? And they may 
well ask why climb the highest mountain? Why, 35 years ago, fly the Atlantic? 
[…] We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not 
because they are easy, but because they are hard.” 
John F. Kennedy, 19621 
 
More than fifty years after Apollo 11 successfully returned to earth, the moon landing 
can still be considered one of the most memorable technological achievements of mankind. 
Yet President Kennedy’s decision to go to the moon was not made for technological reasons 
but should be viewed in the political context of the Cold War. Reflected by the quote above 
from Kennedy’s famous speech at Rice University in Texas, a manned moon landing was 
well suited for emphasizing American exceptionalism because it would show the rest of the 
world that the United States was the only country that had the money, skills, and willpower to 
do something so difficult. As Kennedy would emphasize later in his speech, a crucial element 
of the moon landing was beating the Soviet Union to it. He understood that when Neil 
Armstrong would make his first step, people across the world would be glued to their 
television sets and radios to witness American astronauts planting an American flag. The 
moon landing was a remarkable technological achievement, but it was also the perfect Cold 
War propaganda. 
Kennedy’s decision to accelerate NASA’s Apollo program and put a man on the moon 
before the end of the decade, formally announced about one year before his Rice University 
speech, was not made lightly. One of the bodies that he consulted was the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC). The committee, brought to life by President Dwight 
Eisenhower in 1957, consisted of prominent scientists who were able to assist the president in 
 
1 John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University,” 12 September 1962, Houston, Texas, from the John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library Archives, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/040/JFKPOF-
040-001, p. 4.  
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formulating policies regarding any scientific subject. The direct cause for the establishment of 
PSAC was the successful launch of Soviet satellite Sputnik, and so one of the major themes 
that occupied these scientists was formulating a fitting American space policy. 
The possibility of a manned moon landing had been discussed since the formation of 
the committee, and PSAC had consistently advised against it. The scientists recommended 
focusing on satellites as they had many promising scientific applications, such as weather 
prediction, communication, and measurements of the atmosphere. Even if one were to 
undertake a moon landing, sending a human being would – scientifically speaking – not have 
any added value over sending a robot. Overall, they argued, the money and effort needed to 
bring a man to the moon would not be worth the limited scientific opportunities it would 
yield.2  
Although Kennedy took PSAC’s advice into careful consideration, he evaluated the 
need for a manned moon landing on political terms, not on scientific ones. He did not want to 
carry out the program for the maximization of scientific insights but the maximization of 
world prestige. PSAC members, however, were primarily scientists, and although some of 
them also held board positions within their university or company they were not used to 
thinking in political terms. The committee was used to found its advice on scientific grounds 
and tried to come across as objective as possible. With Kennedy’s politicization of space 
exploration, however, PSAC found itself in a situation where science and politics were 
inextricably linked. The committee thus needed to adapt to the fact that their scientific advice 
would carry political connotations, too.3 
 
2 John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs,” 25 May 1961, Washington D.C., 
from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Archives, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-
viewer/archives/JFKPOF/034/JFKPOF-034-030; President’s Science Advisory Committee, “Introduction to 
Outer Space,” March 26, 1958, Appendix to James R. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower. 
3 Zuoyue Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 219-223. 
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This thesis aims to show how the politicization of space exploration changed PSAC’s 
influence. To do so, this thesis first assesses the committee’s work under President 
Eisenhower to show that PSAC’s influence on space policy was determined by three factors: 
the political relevance of advice, the science adviser’s political tact, and the president’s 
receptiveness towards advice. Then, this thesis describes how these three factors change 
during the Kennedy and Johnson administration. Because Kennedy’s decision to land a man 
on the moon marked a sharp change in space policy since the formation of PSAC, it is 
possible to compare the committee’s advice and influence on the president before and after 
this moment, to conclude how these scientists were affected by the politics surrounding the 
Apollo program. Lastly, this thesis looks at PSAC’s reaction to the politicization of space 
exploration and the committee’s changing influence, and whether these reactions proved 
effective. 
Scientists are generally expected to be objective and apolitical; scientists’ participation 
in a political environment as described above can taint their image, leading to distrust. 
Scientists are increasingly “perceived as hired brains of special interests and lobbyists for 
their own,” Susan Cozzens and Edward Woodhouse write. Scholars in the field of science, 
technology, and the state have been working to deconstruct this dichotomy of the ‘pure 
scientist’ versus the ‘tainted scientist’, arguing that objective scientific research does not 
exist: scientists are influenced by the society they live in, making scientific research 
inherently political. Acknowledging and analyzing the intertwining of politics and science 
provides a better understanding of how one affects the other and can take away from the 
increasing distrust in science. This thesis aims to strengthen that understanding by analyzing 
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PSAC, as the establishment of this committee marked the beginning of institutionalized 
cooperation between scientists and the president during peacetime.4 
Few scholars specifically focus on PSAC, but in the fifty years since Neil Armstrong 
set foot on the moon a lot has been written about the Apollo program. This includes many 
works that outline PSAC’s role in shaping space policy, which makes for a clear idea of how 
the committee has contributed to the process of putting a man on the moon. Because either the 
president or NASA is at the center of such analyses, however, such works only mention 
PSAC’s output and thus depict the committee’s advice as a one-way street, rather than an 
iterative process that includes how PSAC is influenced by the political environment it was in. 
This thesis aims to add to the current literature on PSAC by providing a better understanding 
of what shaped the committee’s degree of influence in the White House and how its members 
responded to a change in their influence. 
This thesis approaches the topic from the discipline of history and is a close reading of 
both secondary and primary sources. Within the topic of this thesis, multiple areas within the 
discipline of history overlap, such as presidential history, the Cold War, and the history of 
science. Secondary sources therefore broadly fall into these three categories: first, presidential 
biographies, literature on the coming about of space policies, and presidential science 
advising; second, literature on the space race; and last literature on NASA and the 
technological process behind the Apollo program. Primary sources include documents from 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administration, many of which are from the Roosevelt 
Institute for American Studies (RIAS) in Middelburg and the John F. Kennedy Presidential 
Library in Boston, and include records of National Security Council meetings and Cabinet 
meetings attended by PSAC members, correspondence between PSAC members and the 
 
4 Susan E. Cozzens and Edward J. Woodhouse, “Science, Government, and the Politics of Knowledge,” in 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. by Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson & 
Trevor Pinch (Thousand Oakes: SAGE Publications, 1995), 533-34. 
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president, and other documents concerning the president’s space policy such as 
correspondence with the NASA administration. Other primary sources include articles or 
autobiographies from PSAC members and contemporary articles from the New York Times.  
This thesis is limited in focus and scope. First, this thesis only focusses on space 
policy, specifically the Apollo program, to draw conclusions on PSAC’s influence in the 
White House. Because Kennedy drastically changed his space policy, this topic makes for a 
good analysis of PSAC’s changing influence and adaption to a political environment. Space 
policy was one of PSAC’s main areas of advice and therefore can reflect larger themes such 
as PSAC’s relationship with the president and the science adviser’s skills in the White House.  
PSAC advised the president on many more topics, however, and the conclusions drawn in this 
thesis might not reflect the committee’s influence in other areas. This thesis also covers a 
limited period, from the foundation of PSAC under President Eisenhower in 1957 up until the 
end of Johnson’s presidency in January 1969. Although the moon landing occurred half a year 
later during Nixon’s presidency, the majority of the work done on the Apollo program as well 
as PSAC’s role in the enterprise took place before Nixon entered the White House. 
Furthermore, the scope of this thesis is far too limited to analyze the vast number of sources 
available on PSAC during this period. This thesis is therefore limited in its focus, both on the 
people within PSAC as well as people outside of PSAC. Within PSAC, this thesis focusses 
mainly on the chairman of PSAC, who also bears the official title of Science Advisor to the 
President and therefore had direct contact with the president. Outside of PSAC, this thesis 
mainly focuses on presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, as they largely shaped the 
political environment of the White House and because PSAC reported directly to the 
president. Although less frequent, this thesis also considers the role of James E. Webb, who 
was the director of NASA during the Kennedy and most of the Johnson presidency.  
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All in all, the costs for putting a man on the moon turned out to be $24.5 billion, which 
would have been $151 billion in 2010. In comparison, the Manhattan project was 28 billion 
and the Panama Canal 8 billion in 2010 dollars.5 It might have resulted in the technological 
highlight of the twentieth century, but if it had been up to Kennedy’s science adviser, the 
money would have been spent otherwise. When discussing the costs of a potential manned 
moon landing, the science adviser wrote: “I do not know a scientist who would support even 
the present level of space exploration … solely for the scientific goals.”6 As this thesis will 
show, sometimes this scientific outlook was welcomed in the White House, but at other times 
it was strongly rejected. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
5 Logsdon, John M. “John F. Kennedy's Space Legacy and Its Lessons for Today.” Issues in Science and 
Technology 27, no. 3 (2011): 29. 
6 Jerome B. Wiesner, letter to Theodore Sorensen, December 19 1960. In Jerry Wiesner: Scientist, Statesman, 
Humanist: Memories and Memoirs, ed. by Walter A. Rosenblith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 459. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Historiography: Science and the State in the Early Cold War 
 
“Science is built up with facts, as a house is built of stones,” the famous 
mathematician Henri Poincaré wrote. Because of this facts-based approach science has the 
appearance of being apolitical, but towards the end of the Cold War historians of science have 
come to agree that science is very much related to politics. In the words of Susan Cozzens and 
Edward Woodhouse, the conception arose that “scientific knowledge is not the passive 
product of nature but an actively negotiated, social product of human inquiry.”1 Although 
politics “has been a part of scholarly life since at least the age of Plato’s Academy,” as David 
Kaiser writes, the relationship between science and politics has played an especially important 
role in the twentieth century.2 The Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb, for 
example, has become a symbol of science and politics coming together: the state directly 
worked with prominent scientists to turn scientific knowledge into military and political 
power. Although the atomic bomb ended the war, rising tensions with the Soviet Union 
ensured that the state remained interested in maintaining close ties to the scientific community 
to enhance national security. World War II, therefore, became “a watershed, restructuring the 
relationship between science and government,” Naomi Oreskes writes. In this new 
relationship, government organizations became the largest funders of scientific research – in 
physics research, for example, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy 
 
1 Susan E. Cozzens and Edward J. Woodhouse, “Science, Government, and the Politics of Knowledge,” in 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. by Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson & 
Trevor Pinch (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1995), 534. 
2 David Kaiser, “The Physics of Spin: Sputnik Politics and American Physicists in the 1950s,” Social Research 
73, no. 4 (2006): 1225. 
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Commission provided 90% of funding in the 1950s and 1960s.3 With the rise of the Cold War 
a closer connection thus developed between science and the state. 
This development gives rise to the question of what impact state funding had on the 
content of scientific research. When military organizations funded scientific research projects, 
they no doubt envisioned results that would enhance national security. With so much funding 
going into scientific research, one would expect that this would, therefore, bring fields with a 
clear military application to the forefront at the expense of fields less relevant in that area. 
Nonetheless, state funding of science, including funding coming from the military, was 
widely regarded as a positive development at the time. Historians of science in the 1960s and 
1970s shared the view that state funding for science was a good thing and therefore did not 
inquire how it might affect scientific research.4 Only towards the end of the Cold War did the 
question of how funding impacted the course of scientific research come to the forefront, 
especially due to a debate between Paul Forman and Dan Kevles. Focusing on physics, which 
saw the most military funding, Forman and Kevles agree that successful cooperation between 
civilian physicists and the state during World War II led to a continued alliance as the Cold 
War emerged, resulting in massive government funding for physics research. The two differ, 
however, in their views on how this alliance affected physics research.  
As Forman argues in an article on quantum electronics published in 1987, the 
enormous amount of funding made physics research turn away from physicists’ priorities to 
the military’s prime concerns. Forman writes that although physicists might have had “the 
illusion of autonomy” believing they had persuaded the military to fund the research of their 
choosing, in reality, “physicists had lost control of their discipline.”5 Rather, the military 
 
3 Naomi Oreskes, “Science in the Origins of the Cold War,” In Science and Technology in the Global Cold War, 
ed. by Naomi Oreskes and John Krige (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), 19-20. 
4 Oreskes, 19. 
5 Paul Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United 
States, 1940-1960,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 18, no. 1 (1987): 229. 
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decided what physics research looked like by choosing to fund projects that promised to yield 
military applications, such as quantum electronics, which became an important field of 
research during the Cold War. Moreover, Forman notes, the military also indirectly 
influenced scientists to work in militarily useful subjects by visiting universities and 
organizing conferences. The Cold War thus drastically changed physics research, Forman 
argues, and although scientists might have thought they were in control, the shift to military 
applications and technologies shows that it was the military who decided what research would 
be carried out.6  
In an article from 1990, Kevles goes against the idea that state funding limited physics 
research to fields with military applications – instead, he proposes that it diversified the field. 
First of all, he argues that Forman incorrectly implies that military funding “seduced” 
physicists away from “true basic physics.”7 According to Kevles, the military very well 
understood that basic research could provide new insights that might be very useful for 
military applications in the future. The atomic bomb, for example, could not have been made 
without insight into particle physics. Rather than leading physicists away from basic physics, 
Kevles argues, state funding was used for both applied and basic research and therefore 
resulted in diversification of physics research. Large basic research projects would never have 
been possible without state funding, Kevles writes, as private companies were not interested 
in investing large sums into, for example, particle accelerators that have no direct application. 
Second of all, Kevles disagrees with Forman’s conclusion that physicists “lost control” and 
were unable to determine their research. Rather, the close relationship between science and 
the state increased physicists’ power. The creation of advisory committees and boards meant 
 
6 Forman, 149-229; Oreskes, 18-23; Sarah Bridger, Scientists at War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2015), 9-12. 
7 Dan Kevles, “Cold War and Hot Physics: Science, Security, and the American State, 1945-1956,” Historical 
Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 20, no. 2 (1990): 241. 
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that scientists had more political power and thus were able to influence where funding should 
go to. According to Kevles, physicists had all but lost control of their field during the Cold 
War – their alliance with the military enabled basic research and gave physicists more 
influence.8 
In the 1990s, much of the literature on Cold War science built on the debate between 
Forman and Kevles.  Leslie Stuart and Rebecca Lowen explore the influence military funding 
had on universities such as Stanford and MIT and support Forman’s argument that the 
military-controlled research at universities. They focus on the “military-industrial-academic 
complex” in which universities were closely tied to the military and defense industries. 
Lowen writes that while Stanford could dictate the terms of their relationship with companies, 
the university had to accommodate to the military because it was too dependent on its 
funding. For example, Stanford decided to prioritize research areas that were more relevant to 
the national interest, resulting in a heavy focus on science and technology at the expense of 
social sciences and humanities. Moreover, results in these areas were often classified, even 
student work and dissertations on basic science, meaning “academic traditions were bent to 
accommodate changed military needs,” Lowen writes, countering Kevles’ argument that 
military funding greatly benefited basic research. Stuart and Lowen thus argue that Forman’s 
idea of the military dominating scientific research was true for scientists working at 
universities due to the rise of the military-industrial-academic complex.9  
Other works support Kevles’ idea that scientists in the 1950s and 1960s gained 
influence and political power. Paul Edwards has introduced the idea of “mutual orientation”: 
on the one hand, the military came to scientists with specific national-defense problems that 
 
8 Kevles, 239-264; Oreskes, 18-23; Bridger, 9-12.  
9 Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997), 140; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-
Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  
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had to be solved, but on the other hand scientists could sell their research area by envisioning 
future military applications. This means that, contrary to Forman’s argument, scientists had 
some influence over what research would be funded.10 Jessica Wang also stresses the idea of 
scientists as active negotiators rather than passive victims of the military-industrial-academic 
complex. Since the use of the atomic bomb, scientists had “plunged directly into the domain 
of national-level legislative politics,” Wang writes, taking political action to protest the 
military’s use of science and technology. Like Kevles, she also stresses that since World War 
II scientists had joined the “top ranks of policymaking hierarchy,” enabling a “direct route to 
political power.”11 Edwards and Wang thus argue that scientists had more means to take 
control of their relationship with the state. 
In the past two decades, historians have broadened the debate by looking beyond the 
United States and the physical sciences. Hunter Heyck and David Kaiser, for example, write 
that the change in the relationship between scientists and the state cannot solely be 
contributed to the military-industrial-academic complex but also took place due to a global 
transformation which was only partly due to the Cold War.12 In line with this idea, some 
historians have started to focus on transnational developments in science and areas other than 
the U.S., such as Western Europe and China.13 Similarly, whereas historians previously 
focused mostly on areas such as physics and chemistry, scholars like David Hounshell and 
 
10 Paul N. Edwards, “From ‘Impact’ to Social Process: Computers in Society and Culture,” in Handbook of 
Science and Technology Studies, ed. by Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson & Trevor Pinch 
(Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1995), 259-61. 
11 Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 6. 
12 Hunter Heyck and David Kaiser, “New Perspectives on Science and the Cold War: Introduction,” Isis 101, no. 
2 (2010): 363. 
13 Jeroen van Dongen (ed.), Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 
2015); Zuoyue Wang, “Transnational Science during the Cold War: The Case of Chinese/American Scientists.” 
Isis 101, no. 2 (2010). 
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David Engerman have broadened the field by focusing on social science, showing that in this 
area, too, military funding played an important role.14  
Historians who remained focused on the topic of physical sciences within the U.S. 
have complicated and moved away from the concept of the military-industrial-academic 
complex. Whereas previous work often treated scientists as a homogeneous group, Jessica 
Wang and Zuoyue Wang highlight differences between scientists and their relation to the 
state. Jessica Wang shows scientists’ differing political views and how this impacted their 
relationship with the state; her focus on the Red Scare shows that the state not only wanted to 
work with scientists to enhance national security but could also view them as a potential 
threat. Zuoyue Wang emphasizes the many different science-related agencies within the 
government, their differing standpoints, and their changing relationship with the government 
throughout time.15 Their work suggests that the idea of the military-industrial-academic 
complex did not do justice to the multifaceted relationship between the government and 
scientists. Other historians have moved away from the military as the main point of focus by 
putting forward other factors that influenced science during the Cold War. David Reynolds 
argues that the U.S. its capitalist economy ensured that consumer markets remained much 
more important than defense industries, meaning that science research did not only have to 
focus on military technology but also consumer technology.16 Audra Wolfe notes that since 
the launch of Sputnik, the goal of government funding was no longer just new military 
applications but also the enhancement of national prestige, which could be achieved in 
various non-military areas. As a result, the government started to heavily fund civilian 
 
14 David A. Hounshell, “Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; 
Rethinking the Social Study of Science and Technology,” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001); David C. 
Engerman, “Social Science in the Cold War,” Isis 101, no. 2 (2010). 
15 Zuoyue Wang, “Transnational Science”; Zuoyue Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science 
Advisory Committee and Cold War America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008). 
16 David Reynolds, “Science, Technology, and the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. 
by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 378-380.   
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organizations such as NASA, which focused on civilian rather than military technology and 
applications. Wolfe supports Forman’s argument by writing that in these areas, too, the 
government largely decided what course scientific research should take to maximize national 
prestige.17 Wolfe does not go into much detail, however, of what the implications of this 
prestige-oriented policy are for science. Whereas scholars have analyzed the military’s 
influence, the effects of prestige on science during the Cold War thus remains overlooked. 
Throughout this debate, the President’s Science Advisory Committee has been 
frequently mentioned as an example of scientists working closely with the government, 
although its role is contested. Sarah Bridger builds on Kevles’ argument by showing that the 
committee greatly enhanced scientists’ political power, as PSAC provided direct access to the 
president; on the other hand, she suggests that PSAC worked in the interest of the government 
and the military. The scientists working on the committee were “patriotic, anticommunist, and 
idealistic,” saw government service and increasing national security as part of their duty as 
scientists, and mainly provided advice on military issues, Bridger writes.18 Other scholars 
have countered this idea by showing that PSAC strongly represented the interests of the 
scientific community. Richard Atkinson and William Blanpied, for example, show that PSAC 
had strong ties to research universities, as most members worked there, and fervently 
advocated for government funding in basic research.19 Ronald Doel and Zuoyue Wang argue 
that the committee also worked in the interest of the scientific community by campaigning for 
scientific international cooperation rather than the classification of research, and show that the 
committee actively went against the interests of the military by advising to halt or greatly 
 
17 Audra J. Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in Cold War America 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 38-42, 89-94. 
18 Sarah Bridger, Scientists at War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 18-23. 
19 Richard C. Atkinson and William A. Blanpied, “Research Universities: Core of the US Science and 
Technology System,” Technology in Society 30, no. 1 (2008): 38-39. 
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reduce funding for military programs.20 By looking at the specifics of PSAC’s work in the 
White House, the latter group of historians thus make a compelling case that the committee 
did indeed represent the interests of the scientific community.  
Whereas the debate on science in the Cold War has evolved away from the idea of the 
military-industrial-academic complex, references to PSAC have not. Scholarship on the 
committee still revolves around the discussion of whether or not the committee was part of 
the complex and mainly looks at its advice on military issues. As Wolfe argues, however, not 
only national security issues but also the desire for prestige influenced the government’s 
funding of scientific research, with NASA as a prime example. This thesis builds on Wolfe’s 
argument and addresses the effects of the government’s wish for prestige on PSAC’s 
scientists. By doing so, this thesis aims to pull PSAC into the recent developments of the 
debate on science and the state in the Cold War. The next chapters evaluate the committee’s 
influence on policy regarding a manned moon landing, which was largely dominated by a 
wish for prestige rather than military concerns, and analyze the committee’s response to the 
program becoming a project revolving around prestige rather than science. In doing so, this 
thesis touches on the core elements of the Forman-Kevles debate by providing insight on the 
government’s influence on science as well as scientists’ influence on the government’s space 
policy during the early Cold War. At the same time, it addresses the underexposed effect of 
prestige-oriented government policies on PSAC’s scientists and thus provides insight into the 
government’s effect on science at large.  
 
 
  
 
20 Ronald E. Doel, “Scientists, Secrecy, and Scientific Intelligence: The Challenges of International Science in 
Cold War America,” in Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge, ed. by Jeroen van 
Dongen (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 29-30; Zuoyue Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Eisenhower and his Scientific Friends 
 
On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first satellite to 
successfully orbit the earth. Although the satellite itself was not very impressive – it was not 
much more than a metal sphere slightly larger than a football – it had a big impact on the 
United States. The launch came as a shock to many Americans, who had not expected the 
Soviet Union to be able to technologically surpass them. The following day, the front page of 
the New York Times featured a big headline reading “Soviet fires earth satellite into space; it 
is circling the globe at 1800 m.p.h.; sphere tracked in 4 crossings over U.S.”1 It was no 
coincidence that the Soviet satellite crossed American soil – Sputnik was meant as a publicity 
stunt, broadcasting beeps that could be picked up by radios, flying over densely populated 
areas, and made extra shiny so that it was easy to spot.2 It proved to be very effective: “the 
American people were deeply disturbed by Sputnik.” John Rigden writes. “Many concluded 
that the Russians now controlled the skies.”3 Before, Americans could feel safe being 
separated from the Soviet Union by an ocean on either side, but now the Soviets had put an 
end to this sense of isolation by penetrating American skies. Furthermore, a rocket that was 
able to put a satellite into orbit would also be powerful enough to launch nuclear weapons.4 
Scientist Edward Teller, the inventor of the hydrogen bomb, even declared on television that 
“the United States has lost a battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor.” The Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik thus implied technological and military superiority, and many 
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Americans wanted to see the U.S. government take action to catch up. Prominent Democrats, 
most notably Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson, seized the opportunity to challenge 
the government by emphasizing the existence of a “missile gap” and insisted on measures to 
close it; military services used the occasion to lobby for increased funding of their rocket and 
missile programs.5 It was at this moment that Eisenhower decided to form the President’s 
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), with which he would closely work together for the rest 
of his presidency to reduce the anxiety caused by Sputnik and to create a fitting space policy.  
This chapter analyzes the extent to which PSAC was able to influence space policy 
and argues that this influence depended on a couple of factors: political relevance of science 
advice, political tact of the science adviser and PSAC as a whole, and the President’s 
receptiveness towards new ideas. To evaluate these factors, this chapter first provides 
background information, both on Eisenhower’s views and management style as well as 
PSAC’s formation, its members, and the committee’s general ideas on space, and then 
analyzes two specific moments: PSAC’s first report in which the committee lays out what the 
American space program should look like, and the creation of space agency NASA. 
In the first days after Sputnik, Eisenhower attempted to take away unrest by 
responding calmly. He assured the public that the Soviet achievement did not mean the U.S. 
was less powerful in either the technological or the military area. In a statement the President 
made four days after the launch, he pointed out that the U.S. had been working on launching a 
satellite for several years, but that this effort was part of an international scientific program. 
“Merging of this scientific effort with military programs,” Eisenhower explained, “could have 
produced an orbiting United States satellite before now, but to the detriment of scientific 
goals and military progress.” He countered the claims of missile gaps by stating that since the 
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satellite program was a scientific and not a military effort, the program “cannot be taken as an 
index of our progress in ballistic missile work.”6 All in all, Eisenhower assured during a press 
conference, the launch “did not increase his apprehensions over the national security of this 
country by ‘one iota’.”7 Eisenhower had good reason to believe that the U.S. did not have to 
worry about Sputnik’s technological and military implications and a potential missile gap: 
intelligence information provided by high-altitude U-2 spy plane flights over the Soviet Union 
had revealed the true state of Soviet missile production, which was not comparable to that of 
the United States. Due to the secrecy of the operation, however, Eisenhower was unable to 
reveal this to the public. The state of American missile programs was also largely kept secret 
to its citizens.8 This “excessive security,” Eisenhower’s first science adviser James Killian 
later wrote, increased post-Sputnik panic because “people were woefully ignorant of how 
much qualitatively advanced and forehanded rocket technology had been under 
development.”9 Unaware of the military advancement the U.S had over the Soviet Union, 
many did not find reassurance in Eisenhower’s calm response and took his remarks as a sign 
of indifference.  
Furthermore, in his statement, Eisenhower neither recognized Sputnik’s psychological 
impact or the need for increasing American prestige. For the President “prestige was a 
relatively minor factor in his broad-based conception of western strength,” David Callahan 
and Fred Greenstein write.10 Eisenhower believed American superiority to be evident through 
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various aspects of American life such as the interstate highway system, supermarkets, and 
vaccinations, which did not appeal to the public – whether at home or abroad – like Sputnik 
did.11 In the eyes of the public, the Soviets’ success in space greatly enhanced their worldwide 
prestige. Conversely, a failed American attempt to launch a satellite two months later was 
thought to damage the country’s image, as reflected by a New York Times headline reading 
“failure to launch test satellite assailed as blow to U.S. prestige.”12 A survey carried out by the 
United States Information Agency confirmed that people found achievements in space to be 
very important for the overall image abroad, and across the world, the Soviet Union was 
deemed well ahead of the U.S. in space for the next ten years. Moreover, “these beliefs have 
adversely affected American standing in other fields” besides space technology, the New York 
Times reported.13 Although Eisenhower acknowledged that by accelerating the American 
space program to eventually beat the Soviets to the moon “we might conceivably gain some 
psychological advantage from doing it first,” coincidentally the U.S. would “fall behind in 
everything else.”14 To Eisenhower, it was not worth taking military and technological 
resources off other projects for potential psychological or prestigious gain.  
Eisenhower’s sober reaction to Sputnik can be attributed to his strong political views. 
Firstly, Eisenhower was a fervent supporter of small government and therefore worked to 
keep federal spending to a minimum. For that reason, accelerating the American space 
program would mean to “fall behind in everything else”: Eisenhower had already made 
available a large sum of money for the current satellite program and was reluctant to increase 
spending in space even further – extra funding in this area could therefore only come from 
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cuts in other programs. Secondly, tied to his wish to keep government spending in check, 
Eisenhower distrusted the military and its constant lobbying for increased funding (which he 
later warned for and famously dubbed the “military-industrial complex” in his farewell 
speech). He deemed national security to be of great importance, but mainly focused on missile 
detection and reconnaissance and believed improvements in these areas could be achieved 
through a few carefully selected, efficient defense projects. To Eisenhower, the military’s 
promotion of missile projects in response to Sputnik’s launch confirmed his distrust, and he 
feared that an accelerated space program would give rise to an ever-increasing sum of money 
going towards the Department of Defense (DOD).15 To counter the public, political, and 
military call for an accelerated space program, Eisenhower frequently emphasized that the 
U.S. was not in a space race with the Soviet Union. “Our satellite program has never been 
conducted as a race with other nations,” Eisenhower declared in his post-Sputnik statement. 
Instead, the space program would be based on “a proper and appropriate plan of scientific 
exploration,” and the U.S. would “follow it positively rather than trying to follow along 
behind somebody else.”16 
Eisenhower’s reluctancy to enter a space race with the Soviet Union produced political 
backlash that lasted throughout his presidency.  Despite Eisenhower’s emphasis that the 
American space program would continue to be based on scientific grounds, space policy 
became an area of political competition between the President and the Democratic majority in 
Congress as well as an international competition between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.17 Eisenhower would continue to be pressured to put more money in space projects, to 
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accelerate the space program, and to enter a space race to redeem American prestige. As he 
was not up for reelection, this lowered the pressure somewhat to use space policy for popular 
gains (to the frustration of Vice President Richard Nixon, who was running for president and 
could neither show off with a new impressive space program nor reveal that the missile gap 
was nonexistent). Nonetheless, it remained difficult for the President to resist demands from 
many different groups for an all-out space race.18 
Both to show that he was taking action and to fend off various pressure groups, shortly 
after Sputnik’s launch Eisenhower appointed a Presidential Assistant of Science and 
Technology and established the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The first 
Assistant of Science and Technology, commonly referred to as science adviser, was James 
Killian, president of MIT. Although not a scientist or engineer but rather a science 
administrator, he was well-respected in the academic world and regarded by many scientists 
as a good choice for science adviser. Eisenhower wanted Killian to be able to formulate well-
founded, independent advice on all kinds of scientific matters, and authorized him to attend 
all National Security Council (NSC) meetings, as well as gain access to all science and 
technology-related plans from the Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and 
the CIA.19 The science adviser was also appointed as chair of PSAC. The committee was 
largely an upgrade of the previously existing Office of Defense Mobilization’s Science 
Advisory Committee (ODM-SAC) to presidential status. The majority of the first-generation 
PSAC members were carried over from ODM-SAC and therefore Eisenhower was already 
familiar with them, but several new members were added as well. The committee was quite 
homogeneous and would largely remain to be so under Kennedy and Johnson: described as “a 
Cambridge mafia” by Zuoyue Wang, most members were either physicists or chemists who 
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held administrative positions at prominent academic institutions like Stanford or MIT. Many 
of them also had experience in working for the government, through ODM-SAC or other 
advisory committees but most notably during World War II for research on the radar or the 
atomic bomb.20 
Due to its uniformity, most PSAC members held the same general ideas on what the 
American space program should look like. Because of the strong representation of academic 
scientists, PSAC was mostly concerned with the state of American scientific research. The 
space program, many members agreed, should therefore mainly focus on gaining new 
scientific knowledge. Just like Eisenhower, they believed that space programs should have 
scientific value rather than focus on copying Soviet achievements. At the same time, they also 
feared that excessive focus on space programs might divert government funding away from 
other scientific areas that were less popular, which they feared might in the long run 
negatively impact American scientific and technological capabilities in comparison to the 
Soviet Union. When Eisenhower met with ODM-SAC shortly after the launch of Sputnik, 
scientist Edwin Land expressed that science in the Soviet Union was “a way of life,” enjoying 
wide support from the public and the government, whereas American scientists felt “isolated 
and alone.”21 PSAC believed that both the scientific community and the government could 
profit from closer cooperation and was a strong advocate for government support of basic 
research. Furthermore, PSAC advised the Eisenhower administration to promote basic science 
to the wider public as well as improve science education, hoping to see an influx of qualified 
scientists and engineers. Although this was partly out of self-interest, they also believed it to 
be in the national interest to have a strong, broadly-developed scientific community.22  
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Eisenhower’s establishment of PSAC was not just for political show – he assigned a 
big role for Killian and PSAC in creating the administration’s space policy. To know which 
projects should be funded and which agency would be most suitable in carrying out such 
projects, the President ordered PSAC to formulate a space program. In March 1958, PSAC’s 
subcommittee on space presented their report Introduction to Outer Space. The report listed 
four reasons for space exploration: most importantly national defense and new opportunities 
for science, but also enhanced national prestige and the “urge of man to explore and 
discover.” The report then continued to explain which projects would and would not be worth 
pursuing – refuting the military’s claims that outer space would be the next battleground. 
Killian recalled that the Air Force, in particular, “made proposals that indicated an 
extraordinary ignorance of Newtonian mechanics.”23 The report clarified that satellites were 
not useful as weapons, noting that one cannot simply drop a bomb from a satellite and that 
“the earth would appear to be, after all, the best weapon carrier.” Military projects that would 
be worth pursuing, however, were satellites for communication and reconnaissance. 
Additionally, the report mainly suggested scientific projects, emphasizing that “the cost of 
transporting men and material through space will be extremely high, but the cost and 
difficulty of sending information through space will be comparatively low,” concluding that 
in the scientific area satellites could be very helpful as well for gathering data on the 
atmosphere, radiation from space, and the weather. The report included a timetable of what 
space projects to undertake, listing projects in geophysics, meteorology, and communication 
as “early,” investigation of the moon and a manned earth orbit as “later,” and a manned moon 
landing as “still later.” Finally, the report concluded that “it would not be in the national 
interest to exploit space science at the cost of weakening our efforts in other scientific 
endeavors,” and that the space program should be seen “as part of a balanced national effort 
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in all science and technology.” This report thus clearly reflected PSAC’s fear of the space 
program’s potential damage to overall scientific research. Firstly, it prioritized scientific space 
projects over manned flights and excessive military activities; secondly, it emphasized that 
space science should be part of broad and balanced governmental support in science.24 
Although for different reasons than the scientists, Eisenhower strongly agreed with the 
report. Whereas PSAC viewed scientific research as the main objective of space activities, the 
President expressed that in his view “the meeting of legitimate military needs is first; then 
comes the development of superboosters to get ahead of the Soviets eventually; and third is 
the scientific work.”25 Despite this difference in priorities, PSAC hit the right note. With this 
report, Eisenhower could show that he had scientific backing in rejecting extravagant military 
proposals and that outer space was unlikely to become a theater for war. On the other hand, 
the report supported reconnaissance projects, which Eisenhower deemed one of the most 
important aspects of defense. The report also reflected the President’s wish to control 
government spending by downplaying expensive manned spaceflights and labeling it as a 
long-term goal. Eisenhower regarded the scientists’ appeal for government funding of basic 
science to be much less problematic, as became apparent by his later support for a far-
reaching education reform bill, called the National Defense Education Act, and funding for a 
particle accelerator at Stanford for research in high-energy physics.26 All in all, Eisenhower 
was so pleased with the report and PSAC’s briefing on it that he wanted the NSC and the 
Cabinet to receive the same briefing. Moreover, he ordered Introduction to Outer Space to be 
publicly released and wrote an introduction to it, stating that he found the report “so 
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informative and interesting” and praising it as a “sober, realistic presentation”. The New York 
Times printed the entire report, and it became widely popular.27  
It was no coincidence that Eisenhower’s and PSAC’s views on science and space 
policy dovetailed – the President had made sure to appoint scientists that he could easily work 
with. Eisenhower had many scientists to choose from when selecting his science adviser. 
Although Killian and the other PSAC members certainly enjoyed a high standing among 
scientists and the general public, there were more prominent and popular scientists available. 
Hydrogen bomb inventor Edward Teller and ex-Nazi rocket developer Wernher von Braun, 
for example, made frequent television appearances and were widely known among the public. 
Both Teller and von Braun publicly advocated for military-technological spectacles, precisely 
the types of projects that Eisenhower wanted to avoid.28 The President disliked a “scientist 
acting like a politician,” and remarked that “some scientists get a little too enthusiastic when 
suddenly in the limelight.”29 When he warned for a “scientific-technological elite” in his 
farewell speech on the military-industrial complex, Eisenhower privately revealed that he had 
scientists like von Braun and Teller in mind.30 On the other hand, the President knew the 
ODM-SAC members and was especially familiar with Killian, who had successfully chaired 
an ad-hoc panel in 1955 to advise him on the inter-service rivalry in the military.31 
Eisenhower was aware that these scientists, too, had a personal agenda, but they did not push 
for it publicly or aim for military-technological projects like Teller and von Braun did. 
Knowing that PSAC shared many of his views on science, space, and the military, 
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Eisenhower could make the committee responsible for shaping his science policy knowing 
that the outcome would support his views. Callahan and Greenstein argue that this was 
“characteristic of his hidden-hand approach to leadership”: by appointing people around him 
who held similar views, he was able to turn issues over to others while ensuring that the 
administration remained heading in the right direction. The advantage of this approach was 
that by outsourcing his space policy to scientists, Eisenhower was depoliticizing the space 
program: as mentioned earlier, Eisenhower promoted the space program as “a proper and 
appropriate plan of scientific exploration,” enabling him to fend off criticism that the program 
was a result of the President’s conservative views.32 Because Eisenhower had influence over 
which scientists would join PSAC, the committee’s views aligned with Eisenhower’s 
reluctancy to enter a space race, enabling the President to further his views on space policy 
while giving the scientists a large degree of freedom. 
The relationship between Eisenhower and PSAC, however, was not just a one-way 
street in which Eisenhower used the scientists’ ideas to further his goals: PSAC also 
influenced the President’s decision-making. By understanding the political issues Eisenhower 
faced, Killian and PSAC were able to advance their views in a way that was helpful to the 
President. A memorandum from Killian to the President on 28 December 1957, shortly after 
the failed American satellite launch, shows the science adviser’s political tact regarding 
sensitive issues. Killian anticipated difficult questions the President might face by explaining 
that “although it is probably true that we are at present behind the Soviets, we are in this 
position largely because we started much later and not because of inferior technology,” and 
that failures of test launches are “normal and unavoidable occurrences in the development” 
which provide “a great deal of necessary information for the test crew.”33 Introduction to 
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Outer Space demonstrates a similar ability of the scientists to tune into Eisenhower’s political 
struggles on space, as the report provided science-based arguments against large military 
space projects and excessive spending. At the same time, PSAC inserted its own beliefs as 
part of a solution to Eisenhower’s problems. The committee shifted the space program away 
from the military, as Eisenhower wanted, and turned it into a scientific effort; it argued that 
being behind the Soviet Union in satellite development was a not defense issue, but rather a 
scientific research-issue. It supported Eisenhower’s wish for limited government spending by 
arguing that investing billions in military spectacles or a manned spaceflight was not worth it; 
instead, investing part of that money in scientific research would be enough. Because Killian 
understood Eisenhower’s views on military involvement in space and government spending, 
he was able to tactically present PSAC’s science-based space policy in a way that appealed to 
the President.  
Although Killian’s understanding of Eisenhower’s views certainly helped to advance 
PSAC’s views, the committee’s influence on space policy was not merely determined by how 
useful the committee was to Eisenhower on a political level – another important factor was 
the President’s openness towards scientific ideas. Instead of meeting with his existing 
advisers after Sputnik’s launch, the President formed a new committee that consisted of 
scientists with very little White House experience compared to others in his administration, 
gave them the freedom to express their unhampered views on space policy, and took those 
into serious consideration. When Eisenhower wanted PSAC to brief the Cabinet and NSC on 
Introduction to Outer Space, he attended both meetings and was eager to learn how satellites 
worked.34 Eisenhower thus displayed an interest that went beyond how PSAC could be of 
political use, making it easier for the committee to bring forward suggestions – like 
supporting basic research in science – that did not fit Eisenhower’s agenda directly but were 
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received positively nonetheless. Furthermore, as the request to brief the Cabinet and NSC 
shows, Eisenhower’s enthusiasm added weight to PSAC’s position within the White House.  
The dynamics described above – Eisenhower need for science advice to fend off space 
race enthusiasts, PSAC’s political tact, and Eisenhower’s openness towards the committee’s 
ideas – were also clearly visible in the selection of a space agency, in which PSAC and the 
science adviser played an important role. Although the DOD would still carry out space 
projects of military value, like the reconnaissance satellites, other programs were to be 
assigned to another agency, either the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 
or the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The main difference was that NACA 
was a civilian agency, whereas ARPA was a military one. Eisenhower preferred ARPA, 
which already had developed better products, but Killian and PSAC’s scientists believed that 
NACA was the right choice. The latter agency was “under the lay direction of some of the 
best civilian talent in the country” and “operated with freedom from political influence and 
unencumbered by the government bureaucracy,” Killian wrote, and PSAC thus deemed 
NACA more suitable for carrying out scientific research.35 During a meeting with 
Eisenhower, Killian opposed the President’s choice for ARPA and explained his preference 
for scientific research in space to be conducted outside the military sphere. Eisenhower agreed 
that scientific research would be better off under a civilian agency and ordered a bill to be 
drafted on NACA becoming the new space agency. The agency was renamed as the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Many teams working on space research 
under the military were moved to NASA; by choosing NACA, Eisenhower was thus able to 
further control military influence on space projects.36 
 
35 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 130-31.  
36 Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow, 94-97. 
 32 
Here, too, Killian was able to influence the President’s decision-making on space in 
PSAC’s favor, both because the science adviser knew how to appeal to Eisenhower and 
because Eisenhower was open to his influence. George Kistiakowsky, Killian’s successor as 
Eisenhower’s science adviser, recalled that the choice of space agency was an important issue 
and that Killian “played a major role in [NASA’s] creation.”37 He appealed to Eisenhower’s 
wish for the military not to dominate the space program, which would be easier if the new 
space agency was a civilian one. The final choice for NACA also shows Killian was willing 
to go against the President when he felt it would benefit scientific research. The outcome goes 
against Callahan and Greenstein’s earlier mentioned “hidden-hand approach” in which 
Eisenhower turned the decision-making process over to people he knew supported his views: 
the decision for NACA means that space policy did not just consist of the President’s existing 
ideas backed up by his science adviser. Killian and PSAC were able to change the President’s 
mind and make a real impact on the administration’s plans in space.  Killian, however, was 
able to influence space policy because Eisenhower let him – if the President had felt strongly 
about ARPA being the right agency the outcome would have been different. As Callahan and 
Greenstein write, “there is no evidence that [Eisenhower] anguished personally over how to 
organize space policy,” and the issue of whether ARPA or NACA would be the right choice 
was not the President’s most pressing matter.38 Killian confirmes that Eisenhower “was not 
convinced that space would become all that important”; he was, therefore, probably willing to 
go along with Killian after hearing his preference.39 The science adviser’s influence thus 
depended on Eisenhower’s willingness to leave important decisions up to him on the one hand 
and his ability to take up such opportunities on the other hand.  
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Regardless of their influence with the President, the committee sometimes struggled to 
keep the space program science-oriented because of NASA, which quickly became a large 
and independent agency. The establishment of NASA meant less military involvement in 
space, but it did not guarantee a balanced, science-based space program: James Killian 
already foresaw that “the problem [with NASA] would rather be one of overenthusiasm if 
anything.” 40 In 1959, Killian resigned and was succeeded by George Kistiakowsky, a 
Ukrainian-born chemist at Harvard University and expert on explosives, who had been a 
member of PSAC since its formation. By the time he became the president’s science adviser, 
NASA had clear plans to accelerate the manned flight program in an attempt to beat the 
Soviet Union. Kistiakowsky thus needed to keep NASA on track in pursuing the scientific 
space program that PSAC had intended, rather than start a space-race for prestige. He 
understood that urging NASA to stop competing with the Soviet Union could have “a 
frightful political effect” with the wider public; he agreed with PSAC that they would have to 
accept competition with the Soviet Union as part of the space program, but that scientific 
research would remain to be the most important aspect of space projects. Kistiakowsky 
closely evaluated NASA’s work, criticizing the agency for “too much hardware and not 
enough science” and too much money being spent on “missions that are many years off,” to 
the dismay of NASA’s administrators.41 In this case, because Eisenhower did not interfere 
with the precise execution of his space policy, PSAC struggled to keep the much larger 
NASA in check without the active backing of the President.  
Apart from keeping NASA in check, PSAC faced the first presidential election since 
its creation, causing uncertainty about the future of space programs and even PSAC itself. 
Kistiakowsky tried to ensure as much as possible that the next administration would continue 
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to make use of PSAC and adopt the current space policy. He made an effort to remain 
nonpartisan during the election period, as to not appear overly affiliated with Eisenhower’s 
administration. Furthermore, a PSAC panel estimated the costs of manned spaceflights so that 
the next administration would be aware of the financial consequences of such an undertaking. 
Shocking Eisenhower, the panel reported that landing a man on the moon would require “an 
additional national expenditure in the vicinity of 26 to 38 billion dollars.”42 Kistiakowsky and 
PSAC thus showed political tact in thinking beyond the elections as to not jeopardize their 
position in the White House, but it also shows that the committee faced uncertainties in which 
Eisenhower’s support was of no help.  
Despite these minor setbacks, PSAC enjoyed an important position during the 
Eisenhower administration, as shown by the good relationship Eisenhower had with PSAC 
and specifically science advisers Killian and Kistiakowsky, which is likely both a source for 
and a result of their fruitful cooperation in shaping space policy. According to I. I. Rabi, one 
of PSAC’s most prominent members, one of the most important conditions for successful 
science advising was a good relationship between the science adviser and the president.43 
Killian underlined the importance of his relationship with Eisenhower, writing: “my 
effectiveness would be directly related to the relationship I would be able to maintain with the 
president.”44 Surely, both Killian and Kistiakowsky succeeded in this area. When Killian 
returned to MIT after one and a half years of service, Eisenhower wrote to tell him how he 
valued their “association and friendship,” and Killian responded to the President’s letter in the 
same way.45 Although Kistiakowsky described his meetings with Eisenhower as “informal” 
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but “largely on the business level,” one PSAC member believed that the President “liked 
Kistiakowsky even better than he did Killian.”46 Eisenhower referred to PSAC as a whole as 
“my scientists” or “my scientific friends” and later revealed that he found his meetings with 
the committee one of the most enjoyable moments of his presidency.47 Although it is hard to 
prove that this good relationship directly translated into political influence, it probably made 
the President at least more perceptive to the scientists’ ideas and opinions and thus made it 
easier for PSAC to influence space policy.  
All in all, PSAC became an influential committee under Eisenhower that played a big 
role in shaping the President’s space policy. This influence can be attributed to three factors: 
political relevance of science advice, political tact of the science adviser, and the president’s 
receptiveness to new ideas. All three factors are visible in PSAC’s report Introduction to 
Outer Space. PSAC’s advice was highly relevant for Eisenhower during Sputnik’s aftermath 
because it enabled him to counter criticism, avoid a growing military influence in space, and 
argue against expensive programs; PSAC displayed political tact by framing their wish for 
scientific research in a way that appealed to the President; lastly, because Eisenhower was 
open to new ideas, he gave PSAC room to come up with new proposals on space policy. Later 
on, PSAC’s success in arguing for NACA as the new space administration was again due to 
Killian’s political insight by showing Eisenhower it would lead to less military influence; 
Eisenhower, on his part, was open to hearing his science adviser’s arguments and willing to 
change his mind. Kistiakowsky showed similar political tact in his dealing with NASA and 
the upcoming elections. Overall, the good relationship between the scientists and Eisenhower 
signifies that Eisenhower was happy with PSAC’s work and that it was easy for the scientists 
to get the President’s attention.  
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In evaluating PSAC’s impact on science policy in space, the question remains whether 
the scientists were able to truly influence Eisenhower or brought forward ideas the President 
already was in favor of. After all, Eisenhower was able to appoint scientists whose ideas on 
science, space, and the military largely overlapped with his own. On one hand, Killian’s 
“profound influence in the formulation of scientific programs to meet the Soviet satellites,” as 
the New York Times reported, was because of his understanding of the political issues 
Eisenhower faced in outer space and his ability to help the President resolve such issues while 
at the same time promoting the interest of the scientific community, an ability that 
Kistiakowsky and other PSAC members shared.48 On the other hand, it is important to 
recognize that Eisenhower’s appointment of the committee meant that he was open to their 
advice and that the President willingly let them influence his space policy. Crucially, the next 
presidents would inherit, rather than appoint, the science advisory committee. As the next 
chapters will show, the degree of influence the scientists were to enjoy in shaping space 
policies of future administrations at times strongly depended on the president’s willingness to 
receive and implement their advice. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Kennedy and the Race for Prestige 
 
With John F. Kennedy coming into the White House, PSAC members had to ensure 
the continuation of science advising. Despite most members being Democrats, the scientists 
avoided affiliation with a single candidate during the campaigning period and supported both 
Kennedy and Nixon, hoping that PSAC would be able to continue its science policy 
regardless of the outcome of the election.1 The exception was PSAC member Jerome B. 
Wiesner, an electrical engineering professor at MIT who had served on the committee since 
its formation and provided Kennedy with scientific advice during the election period. Wiesner 
had known Kennedy since his campaign for senator of Massachusetts in 1952. Wiesner 
recalled that Kennedy would occasionally call “to ask me about certain scientific and military 
issues that he had an interest in,” and the president-to-be continued to do so during the 
election period.2 Once Kennedy was elected, he appointed Wiesner as his science adviser and 
authorized him to attend NSC, Cabinet, and NASA council meetings, just as Eisenhower had 
done.3 Although Kennedy initially questioned the idea of keeping the same members on 
PSAC because they had served under a Republican president, Wiesner convinced him that 
“their allegiance was to the institution of the presidency.”4 In a letter to Wiesner, appointing 
him as chairman of PSAC, Kennedy underlined his support for the committee: “I have a high 
regard for the past accomplishments of the Committee … I shall rely heavily on the 
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Committee for wise counsel.”5 As Kennedy became president PSAC was off to a good start: 
the committee and science adviser would be able to continue their work and enjoy the same 
responsibilities and status as they had under Eisenhower.  
This chapter analyzes how PSAC’s role developed under President Kennedy and 
argues that its influence on space policy declined and became more complicated – despite 
Wiesner’s political tact and long-time connection with the President – because the 
committee’s advice was no longer politically useful. From the moment Kennedy changed his 
stance on space and announced to land a man on the moon before the end of the decade, 
PSAC struggled to impact space policy. First, this chapter will provide an overview of 
Kennedy’s initial stance on space, then an analysis of his decision to accelerate the Apollo 
program and Wiesner’s role in that turning point, and lastly how PSAC responded to the 
politicization of the space program and the different ways in which the committee tried to 
remain involved. Central to the analysis of PSAC’s influence are the three factors that shaped 
the committee’s role under Eisenhower: political relevance, the science adviser’s political 
tact, and the president’s receptiveness towards advice.   
As a senator, Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower for his mild reaction after the 
Sputnik launch and continued to do so during his campaign. Yanek Mieczkowski argues that 
one of the reasons Kennedy became president was his understanding of the link between 
space and national status, which Eisenhower had ignored.6 In one of his campaign speeches, 
Kennedy argued that  the “people of the world” used to admire American technological 
capabilities, but that it was uncertain which country would be the technological leader in the 
future, as “the first vehicle in space was called Sputnik, not Vanguard” and the first dogs to 
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return from space “were named Strelka and Belka, not Rover or Fido.”7 In creating a 
preliminary space policy, Kennedy’s team thus strongly took into consideration the question 
of how to increase prestige. A report from his aides noted that scientific achievements in 
space did not contribute enough to the American image because “these accomplishments are 
not readily appreciated by the layman.” Manned missions were most suitable to increase the 
American image, even though such missions would “contribute relatively little to science.” 
This did not mean, however, that Kennedy planned to turn away from Eisenhower’s focus on 
science in space. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy was willing to spend more, and he planned to 
increase funding in basic research and international cooperation on scientific space programs. 
The “best possible recommended program” put forward by Kennedy’s team focused on 
science, reconnaissance, and unmanned and manned circumlunar flight, with an eventual 
manned lunar landing beyond 1970.8 Initially, landing a man on the moon was thus not 
Kennedy’s main goal in space. All in all, this program was not that different from the 
recommendations in the Introduction to Outer Space report PSAC had written for 
Eisenhower, which focused on scientific research and international cooperation while 
acknowledging the factor of prestige and the possibility of a manned lunar landing in the long 
run.  
During the transition period, Wiesner was important in advising the president-elect on 
space matters. Upon Kennedy’s request, Wiesner chaired a PSAC panel on space that studied 
the current status of the space program and provided a report commonly referred to as “the 
Wiesner report.” According to NASA’s deputy administrator Hugh Dryden, this report “was 
the only knowledge which President Kennedy on coming into office had about the NASA 
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space program,” and was important for the President’s outlook on space policy at the 
beginning of his term.9 The panel devoted much attention to prestige in space, acknowledging 
that “during the next few years the prestige of the United States will in part be determined by 
the leadership we demonstrate in space activities.” The report also argued, however, that it 
was unwise from a prestige perspective to put manned missions forward as the main objective 
in space, as this would emphasize the weakest area of the American space program. Next to 
manned missions “scientific objects must be assigned a prominent place,” the report advised, 
as this was the U.S. its strong suit. The report criticized NASA for not focusing enough on 
scientific research and a lack of scientific manpower within the agency. Next to the promotion 
of science, the report made two other recommendations. It advocated for better management 
of NASA’s space activities: according to Wiesner, lack of decisive management created a 
“critical management problem,” which needed urgent attention once Kennedy assumed office. 
Also, the report promoted international cooperation, stating that long range-space projects 
should be seen “as projects of all mankind” rather than as part of a competition. The report 
was published a few days before Kennedy was inaugurated.10  
The Wiesner report clearly promoted PSAC’s standpoints on space policy. It reflected 
the views PSAC had put forward during the Eisenhower administration: the report argued that 
the position of manned missions within the overall program should not be exaggerated, and 
advocated for the advancement of scientific research through space missions and international 
cooperation.11 The report also reflected PSAC’s past struggles to keep NASA on track: 
Eisenhower’s first science adviser James Killian had warned of NASA’s overenthusiasm and 
his second science adviser George Kistiakowsky had criticized the agency for focusing too 
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much on a space race rather than following the administration’s space policy. This report 
shows Wiesner continued to keep an eye on NASA, closely analyzing and criticizing its 
management and programs. This critique can be traced back to PSAC’s core belief that the 
American space program should be a balanced effort: between military and prestige projects 
on the one hand and scientific projects on the other hand, and also between the space program 
and other scientific research areas on earth.12 During the transition period, PSAC underlined 
this belief once more in a report reviewing the committee’s major actions under the 
Eisenhower administration.13 Wiesner also made sure to emphasize this need for balance to 
Kennedy’s adviser Ted Sorensen, writing that the large expected costs for the space program 
could not be justified by its scientific outcomes. “I do not know a scientist who would support 
even the present level of space exploration … solely for the purely scientific goals,” Wiesner 
wrote, and continued by warning that the expenditure would “undoubtedly impair our ability 
to support other areas of governmental activity, including real science.”14 As Kennedy’s 
unofficial science adviser during the election and transition period, Wiesner thus strongly 
promoted PSAC’s views. 
On the other hand, Wiesner also clearly kept Kennedy’s interests in mind. During his 
campaign, Kennedy had brought up space as an area that needed improvement, and Wiesner 
recalled in his memoirs that he “wouldn’t be able to ignore what was called ‘the space 
problem’ after Kennedy assumed office.” He was aware that Kennedy found prestige much 
more important than Eisenhower and therefore considered a bolder space program.15 The 
Wiesner report not only made scientific arguments but also took into account the program’s 
 
12 John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1970), 19. 
13 “Major Actions of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, November 1957 – January 1961,” Jan. 13, 
1961, OST, reel 64, JFKPL. 
14 Wiesner, letter to Theodore C. Sorensen in Jerry Wiesner, 459. 
15 Wiesner, “Kennedy,” 275-78. 
 42 
effect on American status abroad and made sure to emphasize the gain in prestige tied to 
recent American scientific successes in space. Furthermore, Wiesner was fully aware of the 
psychological and political implications of the Soviet Union’s advantage in space. When he 
found out that the Soviets were soon going to launch its first manned satellite, he warned Ted 
Sorensen and advised to “prepare now to meet the propaganda psychological impact of such a 
success.” Although Wiesner also made clear that a crash program in space would not be the 
right response, joking that “probably the right approach is to make a hero of the Soviet 
astronaut and offer him a movie contract,” he seriously took into consideration the issue of 
prestige, knowing that it was important to Kennedy.16   
At the beginning of his term, Kennedy did not accelerate the space program and 
largely followed the recommendations presented by Wiesner and PSAC. According to 
Richard Reeves, Kennedy was not very enthusiastic about space, and “the only thing that had 
prevented Kennedy from trying to push space of the American agenda early in his term was 
the enthusiasm of Vice President Johnson.”17 When Kennedy was shown the cost estimates 
for a manned lunar landing made by Hornig’s Man-in-Space panel under Eisenhower, he 
agreed with the former president that the operation was too expensive.18 Although NASA 
hoped that the new administration would reverse Eisenhower’s decision to put the manned 
missions on the back burner, deputy administrator Dryden admitted that Kennedy had not 
given them any cause for optimism.19 Indeed, when NASA asked for more funding for their 
manned program in their first meeting with the president, Kennedy postponed this decision. 
He wanted to wait for PSAC’s evaluation of the program, which shows that Kennedy was 
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both relying on PSAC and not very eager to accelerate the space race.20 Kennedy also 
followed other PSAC recommendations. To improve NASA’s managerial capabilities, he 
appointed long-time government official James Webb as the new head administrator of 
NASA, whom Kennedy said was “someone who has had experience with the resolutions of 
large policy questions.”21 In his early speeches, he also called for cooperation in science and 
in space. His inaugural address, Kennedy declared: “let both sides seek to invoke the wonders 
of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars…”22 All in all, President 
Kennedy and PSAC seemed to be on the same page when it came to the space program.  
The reason Kennedy followed the Wiesner report can be attributed to the same factors 
that accounted for PSAC’s influence under Eisenhower. Firstly, Wiesner’s advice was 
politically relevant to Kennedy as it aligned with the President’s ideas on space: Kennedy 
lacked interest and was not very eager to accelerate the manned moon landing because of the 
costs, and the Wiesner report gave Kennedy a reason to largely continue the plans laid out 
under Eisenhower and devote his attention to other topics. Secondly, Wiesner displayed 
political tact by framing his advice in terms of prestige. By arguing that NASA should focus 
on American strong suits like scientific accomplishments, rather than manned programs, 
Kennedy could be assured that choosing to continue the current program would add to 
American prestige, too. Lastly, Kennedy was receptive to what Wiesner had to say, as he 
knew little about the space program and did not have a strong opinion on the matter. The fact 
that Kennedy knew Wiesner well and had asked him for science advice many times before 
undoubtedly added to his openness towards Wiesner’s ideas as well. Relevance, Wiesner’s 
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tact, and Kennedy’s receptiveness thus ensured PSAC’s influence at the beginning of the new 
President’s term.  
Events in the following weeks would change Kennedy’s and PSAC’s consensus on 
space. In April, the Soviets launched their first manned satellite, as Wiesner had predicted. 
Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin successfully orbited the earth and returned safely. Like the launch of 
Sputnik, it received a lot of media attention and marked another clear win for the Soviets in 
space.23 Kennedy congratulated Khrushchev on this achievement, but there was not much else 
his administration could do in the short term. In a press conference the day after Gagarin’s 
flight, the President received remarks that Americans were “tired of being … second to 
Russia in the space field,” and was asked multiple times how he would adapt the space 
program to catch up. Kennedy assured the press that “no one is more tired than I am,” and 
unlike Eisenhower, acknowledged multiple times that the United States was indeed behind.24 
Only a few days later, Kennedy experienced another embarrassment: the Bay of Pigs fiasco, 
in which Cuban exiles trained by the CIA invaded Cuba to overthrow Fidel Castro’s 
government. The US-backed forces were defeated within a few days and American 
involvement was exposed.25 These events marked a difficult start for Kennedy’s presidency, 
and according to Wiesner “the President felt some pressure to get something else in the 
foreground.”26 With the American image damaged by Gagarin’s flight and the Bay of Pigs, 
Kennedy turned to the space program as a means of increasing national prestige.27  
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Towards the end of April 1961, Kennedy shifted from holding off more funding for 
NASA to contemplating an all-out space race. To recover from the Soviet Union putting the 
first man in space and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the President wanted a space program that 
“promises dramatic results in which we could win.”28 Before making the decision to put a 
man on the moon, however, the President wanted to make sure that accelerating the space 
program was the best way to boost the American image. Wiesner recalled that Kennedy 
“talked to hundreds of people in the process of making his decision and he weighed the costs 
with real concern.”29 Among all those people, Vice President Johnson was an important 
influence and a fervent advocate of an expanded space program.30 Like Kennedy, Johnson 
evaluated the space program in political terms. Johnson warned the President that “we are 
neither making maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a 
position of leadership.”31 NASA administrator James Webb and secretary of defense Robert 
McNamara also pushed for a space program aimed at increasing national prestige, writing that 
the program should be seen as “part of the battle along the fluid front of the Cold War.”32 
Kennedy, too, saw the possible gain in prestige as the most compelling argument for pursuing 
manned missions in space. Nonetheless, he remained concerned by the enormous costs, even 
though NASA had provided a much lower estimate of the costs involved in putting a man on 
the moon than Hornig’s Man-in-Space panel had.33 The turning point came in May when 
NASA launched its first astronaut into space. From that moment on, Wiesner recalled, 
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Kennedy was convinced that a manned lunar landing was the way forward.34 A few weeks 
later, Kennedy announced to Congress that “this nation should commit itself to achieving the 
goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon.”35  
In making this decision, Kennedy frequently consulted with Wiesner at first, but the 
science adviser’s role soon diminished. PSAC had already made clear in the Wiesner report 
that “man-in-space cannot be justified on purely scientific grounds” and stuck to its argument 
that a manned lunar landing was far too expensive for the possible results it could bring, 
whether in terms of science or in terms of prestige.36 Although Wiesner was invited to 
numerous meetings on the space issue, it soon became clear that the science adviser could be 
of no help to Kennedy.37 In his conversations with Wiesner, the President sympathized with 
PSAC’s standpoint, but made clear his prioritization of prestige over scientific benefits: “if 
you had a scientific spectacular on this earth that would be more useful – say desalting the 
ocean – or something that is just as dramatic and convincing as space, then we would do it.”38 
The lunar landing had become, as Wiesner put it, “a political, not a technical issue […] it was 
a use of technological means for political ends.”39 Together with Bureau of Budget director 
David Bell, who also worried about the enormous costs, Wiesner and PSAC were the only 
ones in Kennedy’s inner circle who objected to the acceleration of manned missions in 
space.40 The committee’s position was further undermined when the President received 
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support from another group of prominent scientists from the National Academy of Sciences, 
who came out with a report that strongly approved of manned missions in space.41 When 
Kennedy put Johnson in charge to further investigate the space issue, Wiesner was no longer 
invited to meetings on the topic.42 The science adviser did not raise objections, fearing that it 
would lead to an unnecessary confrontation – he understood very well that he represented one 
interest among many and was used to not getting his way, remarking that “the president often 
decided to disregard the PSAC’s favored position … [if] a stand was not politically viable.”43 
Wiesner also did not further discuss the issue with PSAC, knowing that the President and 
Vice President were no longer interested in scientific arguments.44   
Why did Wiesner suddenly lose influence? Lack of a feeling for the political situation 
the science adviser found himself appears not to be the problem: he made sure the President 
was aware of his and PSAC’s opposition to a manned lunar landing but also knew when to 
stop promoting his viewpoint. Rather, it was not about the way Wiesner was conveying the 
message, but the message itself: because Kennedy politicized the space program – “using 
technological means for political ends,” as Wiesner put it – PSAC’s scientific arguments 
became irrelevant because scientific achievements were not the main goal. Although Wiesner 
and PSAC remained opposed to a manned lunar landing, the science adviser understood 
Kennedy’s motivation behind a bigger space program and accepted his declining influence on 
the issue.  
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Wiesner’s political sensitivity undoubtedly contributed to Kennedy and Wiesner 
remaining on good terms despite the science adviser’s dissent on the new plans for space. 
Once Kennedy decided to put a man on the moon, Wiesner went along with it. Although he 
avoided commenting on space when asked to give speeches or other public statements, he 
defended Kennedy’s decision when necessary: responding to critique, he stated that the space 
program represented “the best judgment of Administration officials, Congress, and leading 
scientists and engineers,” and emphasized the importance of improving American prestige.45 
Furthermore, Kennedy appreciated Wiesner and PSAC often took an opposing standpoint on 
space, arguing that it enabled him to see issues from different perspectives.46 “President 
Kennedy once told a reporter that the most important thing I did for him,” Wiesner recalled, 
“was to keep the government from going all one way.” Kennedy thus allowed PSAC to 
continue advising on the Apollo program, and although he often did not end up following 
their advice, Wiesner commented that Kennedy “enjoyed the give and take.”47 Overall, 
Wiesner described his relationship with the President as “intimate” and “confidential”, and 
other members of PSAC confirmed that their relationship with the President was just as good 
as it had been under Eisenhower.48 Kennedy thought the same way, writing that he saw 
Wiesner as “a good friend and trusted advisor … one of those rare individuals … who can 
work effectively to relate the complexities and the opportunities of science to the needs of a 
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nation.”49 Wiesner’s understanding of his political environment on the one hand and 
Kennedy’s appreciation for PSAC’s opposition, on the other hand, strengthened by their good 
relationship, thus ensured that the committee was able to continue its advising on space.  
Despite Kennedy’s politicization of the space program, PSAC continued to advocate 
for the same issues as it had before. With Kennedy’s approval to continue advising on space, 
PSAC’s kept its influential position in the White House and did not stand defeated after the 
acceleration of the Apollo program. To keep its advice relevant, PSAC stayed within the 
framework of the program: the committee still closely evaluated NASA’s work, but now 
specifically focused on how the agency planned the manned moon landing. It also focused on 
the possibilities of scientific research within the Apollo program. Furthermore, Wiesner 
continued to promote international cooperation when criticism arose over NASA’s expenses. 
Kennedy always listened to the committee’s advice, but the President’s response varied 
strongly depending on his political needs.  
PSAC’s evaluation of NASA’s work resulted in a big debate over the best way to get 
to the moon. NASA favored the “Lunar Orbit Rendezvous” (LOR): a big rocket would bring 
the astronauts in an orbit around the moon, from where a module would decouple to land on 
the surface. Afterward, the module would go back into lunar orbit, couple with the original 
rocket, and fly back to earth. PSAC, on the other hand, favored the “Earth Orbit Rendezvous” 
(EOR): two rockets would launch separately, couple while orbiting the earth, and then fly to 
the moon where it would land directly on the surface.50 NASA believed that the lunar landing 
could be made five months sooner using LOR compared to EOR. PSAC preferred EOR 
because it was cheaper and because it promised beneficial for scientific research. Firstly, the 
method would allow for more payload, which meant more scientific equipment could be 
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brought to the moon. Secondly, the technique used with EOR would be useful for future space 
applications, such as a space station in earth orbit.51 LOR was, as Walter McDougall 
describes, “a ‘technological dead end’ of limited future value to the space program.”52 
Wiesner worked hard to make his opinion known: his preference for EOR was stated in many 
PSAC reports, he wrote to David Bell from the Bureau of Budget to address the extra expense 
of the LOR method, and he directly informed the president of the benefits EOR would 
bring.53 NASA resented PSAC’s meddling, but Kennedy again liked to hear the different 
opinions. When NASA rocket scientist Wernher von Braun explained to Kennedy that LOR 
was the best method to go to the moon, the President mentioned that his science adviser 
thought otherwise; he called for Wiesner, and a heated debate between the two scientists 
ensued. In the end, however, Kennedy did not intervene with NASA’s plans. Without active 
support from the President, PSAC was unable to change NASA’s direction, and the agency 
continued with LOR.54  
Apart from the LOR-EOR debate, PSAC also tried to safeguard scientific research in 
other ways, but without much success. The committee issued a report stating that NASA was 
growing rapidly due to the Apollo program, but that universities’ output of PhD scientists and 
engineers remained the same. This would mean that the agency would soon absorb most of 
the technological manpower available, to the disadvantage of other scientific fields. It would 
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also mean that fewer scientists would stay at universities to teach, making it harder to ensure 
even the current output of PhDs. PSAC thus advocated for increased funding for science 
education.55 Furthermore, PSAC pushed for more scientific research within NASA. The 
committee argued that “past U.S. successes in space science are responsible for a good deal of 
the prestige the U.S. now has in space,” but that NASA was neglecting these areas in favor of 
the manned missions.56 Within the Apollo program, too, PSAC called for more scientific 
research, such as unmanned flights to inspect the surface of the moon to ensure the astronauts’ 
safe landing.57 PSAC was lucky to have the support of NASA administrator James Webb, 
who also called for “a balanced space program in which adequate resources are invested in 
research.”58 Here too, however, PSAC did not find Kennedy’s support – on the contrary, 
Kennedy disliked Wiesner and Webb’s suggestion of a balanced space program that also 
focused on science. When the three met in the White House, Kennedy told them: “everything 
that we do ought to really be tied into getting on the moon ahead of the Russians.” When 
Webb asked why the program couldn’t be focused on general preeminence in space, the 
President replied:  
Because, by God, we’ve been telling everyone we’ve been preeminent in space 
for five years and nobody believes us … the policy ought to be that this is the 
top priority program of the agency … otherwise we shouldn’t be spending this 
kind of money because I’m not that interested in space … we’re talking about 
fantastic expenditures which wreck our budget and all these other domestic 
programs and the only justification for it, in my opinion, is to do it because we 
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hope to beat them and demonstrate that starting behind as we did by a couple of 
years, by God, we passed ‘em.59 
 
This shows that Kennedy’s only concern at this point regarding space policy 
was getting to the moon as fast as possible and that he was not open to suggestions 
deviating from that goal. The only value the Apollo program had to Kennedy was its 
direct pay-off in terms of American prestige. His evaluation of space policy in 
political terms was not new to PSAC; Eisenhower had done so too. The difference was 
that Eisenhower aimed for US supremacy in space, science, and overall economy in 
the long term, which left room for PSAC to propose scientific projects without an 
immediate pay-off. Kennedy, on the other hand, tied US supremacy to the manned 
lunar landing happening as soon as possible, which left no room for PSAC’s ideas on 
science unless it contributed to executing the Apollo program as fast as possible. 
Kennedy was willing to let the LOR-EOR debate happen between PSAC and NASA, 
as it directly concerned how astronauts would reach the moon, but did not want to hear 
about extra investments on scientific research. Despite Wiesner and PSAC’s efforts to 
make their ideas known, the committee’s position was marginalized: its ideas on 
science were not welcomed by the President, and its ideas directly related to the 
execution of the Apollo program were overruled by NASA. 
Wiesner successfully put forward the idea of cooperation in space, however, because 
the idea was politically relevant to the President. Kennedy had liked the idea of cooperation 
since the beginning of his presidency, and so Wiesner had asked a PSAC panel to prepare a 
report on possible space programs in which the U.S. could cooperate with the Soviet Union.60 
Wiesner continuously promoted the option, and in 1963 the idea caught on with the President. 
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At that time, criticism was rising on the Apollo program. Scientists were speaking out against 
the uselessness of the program and advocated for an unmanned lunar landing, which would –  
scientifically speaking – be just as useful; Congressmen, too, started to doubt if the program 
was worth the money.61 The New York Times reported that “there is widespread and growing 
Congressional misgiving over the management of the space program and the emphasis being 
placed on the manned lunar landing.” Senator J. W. Fulbright said that he could not believe 
“that landing an American on the moon represents the most urgent need, the most compelling 
challenge, or the most promising opportunity before the American people in this decade.” 
Congress threatened to cut funding for the program, which would likely make it impossible 
for Kennedy to achieve his goal of landing a man on the moon before the end of the decade.62 
The President was sensitive to these criticisms, and cooperation on the manned lunar landing 
seemed an easy way out. “If we cooperate, the pressure comes off,” national security adviser 
McGeorge Bundy told the President, “and we can easily argue that it was our crash effort on 
’61 and ’62 which made the Soviets ready to cooperate.”63 At the United Nations General 
Assembly in September 1963, Kennedy proposed to work together with the Soviet Union in 
space.64 Dryden acknowledged that the idea of cooperation was likely to derive from Wiesner 
because he proposed it so often.65 Wiesner’s skills as a science adviser play a major role in 
successfully addressing international cooperation, as he understood the President’s needs and 
how to bring his advice to the forefront. Ultimately, however, the reason that Wiesner’s idea 
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of international cooperation was taken into consideration and his proposals on scientific 
research in space were not was their political relevance to the President. To Kennedy, the idea 
of international cooperation was relevant because it could help avoid him losing face, whereas 
scientific research had no added value to him. Unfortunately for Wiesner, Khrushchev did not 
react to Kennedy’s proposal to cooperate. He only commented that “at the present time we do 
not plan flights of cosmonauts to the moon. I have read a report that the Americans wish to 
land a man on the moon by 1970. Well, let’s wish them success.”66 Less than a month later 
President Kennedy was assassinated, and the idea of cooperation in space with the Soviet 
Union was never seriously considered again. 
Although much changed for PSAC during the Kennedy presidency, the committee’s 
influence was determined by the same three factors as it was under Eisenhower: political 
relevance, political tact, and Kennedy’s receptiveness towards advice. Under Kennedy, PSAC 
continued to promote a balanced space program centered around scientific research and 
advised against a space race, which caught on with the new President at first. The message 
was relevant to Kennedy, as it aligned with his personal views; Wiesner understood the 
politics around space, addressing Kennedy’s concern about prestige; also, Kennedy was very 
willing to listen to Wiesner’s advice, having known the scientist for a long time. With 
Kennedy’s decision to accelerate the Apollo program PSAC’s influence declined: the 
President’s priority of increasing prestige did not align with PSAC’s focus on scientific 
research, making most of the committee’s advice politically irrelevant. Despite being one of 
the very few critics of the accelerated Apollo program in the White House, PSAC was able to 
continue advising on space. This was both due to Kennedy’s continued openness towards the 
committee’s ideas, as well as Wiesner’s skills as a science adviser, as he understood the 
President’s needs and used his connections to further PSAC’s advice. PSAC kept promoting 
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its original standpoints, only now tailored to the Apollo program; the effectiveness of their 
advice varied, however, depending on Kennedy’s political needs. He cared little about how 
exactly to get to the moon and did not interfere in the LOR-EOR debate, but he strongly 
declined proposals for scientific research because it diverged from his goal of prestige. After 
widespread critique on the rising costs, Kennedy immediately picked up on Wiesner’s idea of 
international cooperation because it offered a politically viable way out of the Apollo 
program. Overall, PSAC’s position during the Kennedy presidency was good but 
complicated. The committee enjoyed a high position in the White House and direct access to 
the President, but rather than the steady influence the committee enjoyed under Eisenhower, 
the impact of PSAC’s advice fluctuated depending on its political relevance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Johnson and the Decline of Science Advising 
 
 
The assassination of Kennedy left much uncertain. When Johnson took over the 
presidency, he prioritized taking away this uncertainty by showing his support and 
continuation of the former President’s work. Many important figures who were part of the 
Kennedy administration disliked Johnson, yet the new President persuaded them to stay. 
Remarkably, as Robert Caro notes, the Kennedy administration thus remained almost fully 
intact after Johnson came into the White House.1 Johnson used his vast experience with 
Congress to ensure that bills prepared by the Kennedy administration would be accepted. 
Kennedy’s ambitious goal in space would be continued, too, Johnson announced in his first 
State of the Union a couple of weeks after his inauguration. “We must assure our pre-
eminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space,” Johnson said, “focusing on an 
expedition to the moon in this decade.”2 Despite the financial troubles this goal brought, with 
Congress constantly wanting to cut funds and NASA wanting to increase them, in the 
following years of his presidency Johnson saw to it that the Apollo program would become a 
success.3  
This chapter analyzes PSAC’s role regarding the continued Apollo program and the 
post-Apollo space program and argues that its influence strongly declined, not only because 
the PSAC’s advice remained politically irrelevant but also because the committee did not 
have the close ties it had with Eisenhower and Kennedy. First, this chapter assesses the three 
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factors used in previous chapters determining the impact of science advice at the start of 
Johnson’s presidency – first Johnson’s receptiveness of advice, then the new science adviser’s 
political tact, and lastly the political relevance of PSAC’s advice. As none of these three 
criteria were met, the committee’s advice had very little impact. This chapter then shows 
PSAC’s response to its declining position in the White House, in which the committee tried to 
remain objective and critical on the one hand, while trying to increase its relevance for the 
Johnson administration on the other hand. The chapter ends with the Vietnam War further 
deteriorating the relationship between PSAC’s scientists and Johnson, and later President 
Nixon as well, ultimately leading to the abolishment of the committee. 
To understand Johnson’s views on space and his relationship with NASA and PSAC, 
it is useful to look back at his years as a senator and vice president. When Johnson became 
president, he was not merely inheriting Kennedy’s space program – he had been strongly 
involved in shaping space policy since the launch of Sputnik in 1957. As a senator, Johnson 
used Sputnik as an opportunity to criticize the Eisenhower government and became, as Robert 
Dallek puts it, the Senate’s “space czar” who continuously argued for an all-out effort to beat 
the Soviets in space.4 He led Congressional hearings on the American backlog in space, which 
he proclaimed was “perhaps the greatest [threat] our country has ever known,” set up and 
chaired the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, and co-sponsored bills on the 
creation of NASA.5 His involvement in space continued during Johnson’s years as Vice-
President. Kennedy appointed Johnson as chairman of the National Space Council, a position 
previously held by the president, making Johnson responsible for reviewing NASA’s work. 
Johnson also convinced Kennedy to appoint his friend James Webb as the administrator of 
 
4 Robert Dallek, “Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning,” in Spaceflight and the 
Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. by Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1997), 70. 
5 “Excerpts From the Comments of Senator Johnson, Dr. Teller and Dr. Bush,” NYT, Nov 26, 1957, p. 20; 
Robert Dallek, Lyndon B. Johnson, Portrait of a President (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 110. 
 58 
NASA, with whom he frequently discussed space issues.6 As shown in the previous chapter, 
Johnson was a big advocate of the manned moon landing Kennedy was considering, 
persuading the President that “more resources and more effort need to be put in our space 
program as soon as possible.”7 As a president, Johnson’s support of the space program was 
therefore not only a show of continuity with the Kennedy presidency but also something he 
had lobbied for since 1957.  
Despite the continuation in space policy, Johnson’s move to the Oval Office ushered 
in significant change for the scientists in PSAC. First of all, their relationship with the 
President changed, and with that the President’s receptiveness to scientific advice, too. 
Contrary to Eisenhower and Kennedy, Johnson did not have a close connection with PSAC’s 
members. This had already become clear when, as vice president, Johnson had to help 
Kennedy in his decision to go to the moon: in all the briefings on the topic and when drawing 
up his recommendations to Kennedy, he did not once involve science adviser Jerome 
Wiesner.8 Once Johnson became president, the lack of attention to the position of science 
adviser continued. Johnson did not have a candidate for the position in mind, which says 
something about the extent to which he cared about the position. Coincidentally, Kennedy had 
appointed a new science adviser just a week before his assassination: Donald Hornig, a 43-
year-old chemistry professor from Princeton who had worked on the Manhattan project and 
had led PSAC’s Man-in-Space panel that estimated the costs of a manned moon landing for 
the Eisenhower administration. In line with his goal to stress continuity, Johnson decided to 
appoint Hornig as the new science adviser. Whereas the previous two presidents had chosen a 
 
6 Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
335-37, 397.  
7 Johnson to Kennedy, Apr. 28, 1961, John F. Kennedy’s Office Files part 1, reel 3, RIAS.  
8 John M. Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
90-91, 99.  
 59 
science adviser they knew and trusted, Johnson had not met his science adviser until he was 
formally appointed.9 
The change in the relationship PSAC had with the President was not just due to a lack 
of acquaintance. As Zuoyue Wang describes, there was a “mismatch between the populist 
Johnson and his science advisers from the Ivy League.”10 On the one hand, Johnson was not 
receptive to PSAC’s advice – unlike Eisenhower and Kennedy, who had been open to science 
advice and took PSAC’s input into serious consideration. W. Henry Lambright describes 
Johnson as “highly pragmatic and concerned with visible ‘payoffs’ in the short term,” which 
did not match the apolitical, long-term thinking that had made PSAC so popular with 
Eisenhower.11 Neither did the new President “have the same kind of personal interest in 
science or intellectual curiosity as Kennedy,” Walter McDougall points out.12 Under 
Kennedy, PSAC had already experienced that scientific advice was not always of use when 
decisions were made on purely political grounds, but they always had a seat at the table 
because Kennedy valued their point of view. Johnson, however, entered the office with a clear 
agenda in mind and was not looking to discuss this with PSAC’s scientists. Barely two 
months into Hornig’s function as presidential science adviser, Johnson angrily told one of his 
aides that Hornig should “quit writing notes … when I want an opinion from him, I’ll ask for 
it.”13 Johnson, however, rarely asked Hornig for advice and ignored his science adviser on 
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many big issues relating to science.14 He also took away PSAC’s privileges of attending NSC 
meetings and accessing science-related government plans.15 The regular and informal access 
to the Oval Office that PSAC had enjoyed since its establishment thus ended when Johnson 
became president.  
Next to Johnson’s lack of interest in the committee, Hornig had difficulties 
maneuvering in the political White House environment, adding to PSAC’s inability to get 
through to the President. Whereas previous science advisers “were in the inner circles of their 
respective Presidents and were essentially on a peer basis with senior White House aides,” 
William Wells writes, Hornig was a “nice guy” who “accepted a secondary role.”16 Whereas 
Kennedy’s adviser Wiesner, for example, had worked together with NASA administrator 
James Webb and Bureau of Budget director David Bell to spread PSAC’s ideas, Hornig was 
less apt in making the scientific voice heard in the White House. Also, whereas previous 
advisers understood and framed advice to fit their president’s point of view, Hornig wrote that 
he had “little feeling for [Johnson’s] strong, dominant personality who saw everything in 
political terms.”17 Although Hornig was an excellent scientist, he lacked the political skills to 
further PSAC’s ideas.  
Not only PSAC’s position in the White House but also the content of the committee’s 
work shifted under Johnson. Since the launch of Sputnik, the development of science and 
technology had been a goal in and of itself. Lambright argues that this “technoscience surge” 
ended under Johnson: the President’s plans for the Great Society meant that the development 
of science and technology was no longer a goal on its own, but rather took on a supportive 
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role as a tool to end poverty.18 Whereas PSAC previously studied mostly military matters, 
topics shifted to world food supplies or environmental issues.19  In Johnson’s eyes, science 
and technology had little value on their own – rather, they were a tool to gain political 
leverage. When trying to get the Civil Rights Bill to pass, for example, Johnson ensured the 
support of the Republican House minority leader Charles Halleck by allocating large NASA 
research programs to his district.20 Similarly, Johnson used science as a tool in foreign 
relations: two times, for his meeting with the Prime Minister of Japan and with the President 
of South Korea, Johnson was unsatisfied with what he could offer the foreign leaders and 
called Hornig for ideas – ultimately leading to extensive science research collaboration 
programs with the two countries.21 The end of the technoscience surge and Johnson’s focus 
on political leverage meant that science and technology had to prove their political usefulness 
and were no longer automatically a priority in the White House, as they had been under 
Eisenhower and Kennedy.  
The three factors that determined PSAC’s influence on space policy – political 
relevance, the science adviser’s tact, and the president’s receptiveness – thus all declined from 
the start of the Johnson administration. What did this mean for PSAC’s position in the White 
House? Now that science advice had moved to the back of the agenda for both personal and 
political reasons, PSAC’s status declined as well. Hornig admitted that he was “never a part 
of, or even near to, the inner circle.”22 William Wells writes that although Wiesner had 
represented Kennedy’s thoughts on many science-related topics, Hornig did never “speak for 
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Johnson.”23 Especially on matters regarding space Johnson rather turned to NASA 
administrator James Webb, whom he had known and worked with for over fifteen years.24 If 
PSAC wanted to obtain the President’s attention it would have to push its ideas, but this posed 
a big challenge for the committee: first because Hornig had little experience in Washington 
and lacked connections to get to the President, and second because advocacy could harm the 
objective image that PSAC had prioritized since its establishment. PSAC thus had to try to 
improve its standing in the White House on the one hand, while protecting its objectiveness 
on the other.  
For a large part, PSAC tried to maintain its critical, scientific outlook on space policy, 
but its critique had little effect. When the DOD developed an elaborate plan for a space 
laboratory, PSAC advised to instead start with launching simple capsules and to gradually 
improve the laboratory from there. NASA and President Johnson quickly sided with the 
DOD, and Hornig was forced to go along with the plan, with little of his critique being 
considered by the other parties.25 In 1967, the three astronauts that were supposed to be on 
Apollo 1 died in a fire that erupted during a test launch. PSAC wanted to investigate what 
NASA could have done to prevent the accident, but Webb successfully held the investigation 
off.26 PSAC’s lack of influence again became clear when Webb resigned in October 1968. 
The administrator was frustrated by the declining funding for NASA and told the press that 
the budget cuts could result in the US losing its advantage over the Soviet Union in space.27 
Hornig was quick to inform the President that Webb’s statement was untrue as the Soviet 
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Union was still far behind. Johnson, annoyed by Hornig’s lack of political sensitivity, told his 
science adviser to “drop it!” and warned that under unforeseen circumstances the Soviet 
Union might still catch up, in which case PSAC would look untrustworthy.28 The incidents 
above show that PSAC’s critique was not welcomed. Although the previous chapters have 
shown that it had always been difficult for the committee to go against such a large agency as 
NASA, even during the Eisenhower presidency, Johnson and Webb’s alliance made it nearly 
impossible for PSAC to get their voice heard.  
Perhaps because of PSAC’s continued frustration in failing to change NASA’s course, 
in 1967 the committee changed its stance on the Apollo program to boost its image and 
influence. Although PSAC had been wary of manned programs since the very beginning, the 
committee seemed to accept the inevitability of the manned lunar landing and embraced it as 
an opportunity to promote scientific research within the administration as well as with the 
larger public.29 Two members of PSAC, for example, developed a special camera for the 
astronauts to take close-up pictures of the lunar surface, which geologists could study.30 The 
committee also published a report on future space programs, called The Space Program in the 
Post-Apollo Period, which was – unlike earlier reports – mostly in line with the 
recommendations of NASA’s advisory board. The report called for many more future space 
programs to be carried out, including manned and unmanned lunar explorations, probes to 
Venus and Mars, and a space laboratory circling the earth. Although the report was still 
heavily focused on scientific research, as the committee’s first report Introduction to Outer 
 
28 Dallek, Flawed Giant, 422-23. 
29 Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow, 250-51. 
30 Thomas Gold, “Apollo 11 and 12 Close-up Photography,” Icarus 12, no. 3 (1970): 360. 
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Space had been, recommendations like planning one to two manned lunar landings per year 
showed that PSAC went from man-in-space skeptic to man-in-space enthusiast.31  
PSAC’s changing stance on manned programs is important because it was a political 
move intended to gain a better position in the administration: a reaction to the politicization of 
space that began when Kennedy decided to accelerate the Apollo program on the grounds of 
prestige. From then on, PSAC’s influence declined because the committee’s scientific outlook 
on space became less relevant to the president. With Hornig’s second-rate position in the 
White House and Johnson’s unwillingness to ask PSAC for advice, the committee found itself 
unable to influence space policy advocating for the same issues since its establishment a 
decade earlier. Siding with NASA on the post-Apollo program was an attempt to stay relevant 
in the administration: instead of being an outlier, the committee could promote its program 
together with NASA, both strengthening Hornig’s position in the White House and potentially 
making Johnson more receptive towards the scientists’ ideas.  
Unfortunately for PSAC, by this time Johnson was fully occupied with the worsening 
Vietnam War, which led to large cuts in NASA’s budget and worsened the scientists’ 
relationship with the President. Although Johnson was reluctant to decrease the space 
agency’s budget, having advocated for a large space program for so many years, he was 
forced by the large war expenditures and pressure from Congress. Although NASA warned 
that decreased funding would make a safe moon landing within the decade impossible, 
Johnson saw the budget cuts as an opportunity to point to Congress if the Apollo program 
were to fail.32 NASA’s budget declined from $5.9 billion in 1966 to $3.8 billion in 1966, and 
the agency announced that it would need to cut one-fifth of its workforce.33 Although the 
 
31 President’s Science Advisory Committee, The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period (Washington: U.S. 
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agency was able to finish the Apollo program with the available budget, it became clear that 
NASA would not carry out any of the large programs that it had envisioned post-Apollo.34 
Space exploration thus hit a dead end and left PSAC unable to promote scientific research in 
outer space. Furthermore, many scientists strongly disagreed with Johnson over the Vietnam 
War, causing the relationship between the President and the committee to worsen.35 Hornig 
explained that “there was a continuing erosion of confidence in the political loyalty of our 
office” causing “a gradual erosion in respect to everything else we did.”36 PSAC’s position in 
the White House further declined: whereas in early 1965 one of Johnson’s White House aides 
reminded Hornig that he was “always and automatically invited” to Cabinet meetings, he was 
not present at any of the meetings in 1966.37 
This sentiment was carried over when Richard Nixon became president in 1969. 
Despite the manned moon landing was carried out successfully that summer, Nixon rejected 
new projects proposed by NASA. As Roger Handberg writes, “The Nixon administration was 
uninterested in space policy per se once the glamour or historical significance of the Eagle 
lunar landing was past.”38 This did not mean that PSAC could go back to promoting scientific 
space endeavors. Nixon’s science adviser, former Caltech president Lee DuBridge, hardly 
spoke to the President directly and had to deal with his staff instead.39 Wells remarks that 
DuBridge, like Hornig, “lacked a certain inner toughness” that was required in the Nixon 
White House leaving him unable to get PSAC’s ideas across.40 On top of that, Nixon strongly 
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disliked the scientists: Wiesner wrote that the President “didn’t trust many people, and was 
particularly mistrustful of scientists who were, in his view, all liberal and against him.”41 To 
Nixon, his suspicion was confirmed when some PSAC members – frustrated by the lack of 
presidential attention – made public remarks of their disagreement with the administration. 
PSAC lost its status as an objective committee and came to represent the larger academic 
opposition to the war. Shortly after his re-election, Nixon abolished PSAC and the position of 
Presidential Science Advisor.42 The politically opposing views, the lack of political tact from 
both DuBridge and other PSAC members, and Nixon’s distrust towards the scientists led to 
the end of presidential science advising.  
Although space policy remained the same when Johnson took over the presidential 
office, a lot changed for PSAC. The committee had grown used to its ideas declining in 
relevance since Kennedy’s decision to accelerate the Apollo program, but Kennedy still 
considered their advice – both because Wiesner was able to get PSAC’s ideas to the President 
and because the President was willing to listen. Both of these factors changed under the 
Johnson administration. Hornig’s lack of acquaintance with Johnson and his inexperience in 
the highly political environment of the White House meant that PSAC lost its position in the 
inner circle. Johnson, on his part, was not very welcoming of advice that was not based on 
political considerations and rarely asked Hornig for his opinion – especially regarding issues 
on space, because Johnson would rather talk to Webb. All three factors necessary for effective 
science advising were missing. PSAC remained active in evaluating and criticizing NASA’s 
work, but without success.  
The scientists realized that their diminishing role was due to a lack of political 
compatibility with Johnson, and that to increase influence PSAC had to respond in a political 
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manner. The result was a pragmatic turnaround on the Apollo program and full support of 
NASA’s future endeavors. With NASA on its side, PSAC might have gotten more power in 
the White House. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War negatively impacted both the political 
relevance of space policy and PSAC’s relationship with the President. Despite Johnson’s 
enthusiasm for space he was forced to approve drastic cuts in NASA’s budget. The opposition 
of PSAC’s members to the war made Johnson even less receptive to the committee’s advice, 
whose loyalty he had questioned from the beginning. Nixon’s shared this distrust, ultimately 
leading to the end of science advising. Although the Vietnam War was an important factor in 
the abolishment of PSAC, it was a catalyst rather than the main cause: it enlarged the distrust 
and political mismatch that had been present from the beginning of Johnson’s presidency. 
Even without the war, it would have been extremely difficult for PSAC to turn around its 
declining status. The Johnson years show a president unwelcoming of science advice and a 
committee struggling to adjust to a political environment, which left PSAC with no power to 
impact space policy.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Nixon made an end to PSAC, but luckily for the scientific community, Gerald Ford 
appointed a new science adviser three years later. The president has had a science adviser ever 
since. Never again, however, would so many high-standing scientists work so closely with the 
president as PSAC did under Eisenhower and Kennedy, and to some extent under Johnson. 
The reason for PSAC’s influence on such an important topic as space policy, and the reasons 
behind the decline in that influence, provide insight into what scientists can do for the 
government, but also how the government affects science.  
This thesis argues that three factors determined the extent of influence PSAC had on 
space policy: the political relevance of the committee’s advice, the science adviser’s political 
tact, and the president’s receptiveness to science advice. Advice was politically relevant when 
it served the president’s agenda at the time – a factor that differed per president but could also 
change within an administration. The science adviser’s political tact was determined by his 
understanding of the president’s needs and ability to frame science advice to fit those needs, 
as well as his experience with and connections within the White House environment to further 
PSAC’s ideas. The president was receptive to advice when he was willing to listen to, or 
frequently asked for, PSAC’s opinion regardless of its political usefulness. From the 
establishment of PSAC in 1957 to the end of Johnson’s presidency in 1969 these three factors 
strongly varied, impacting PSAC’s influence on space policy. 
Kennedy’s decision to accelerate the manned moon program marked a sharp change in 
the political relevance of PSAC’s advice. Under the Eisenhower administration, PSAC’s 
scientific outlook aligned with Eisenhower’s reluctancy to get into a space race. The 
committee’s focus on scientific research matched Eisenhower’s long-term Cold War strategy 
aimed at eventual superiority over the Soviet Union, rather than short-term gains in prestige; 
also, PSAC’s wish to balance science in space with other scientific areas on earth matched 
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Eisenhower’s wish not to spend too much on space projects. At the beginning of Kennedy’s 
term, the President lacked a political outlook on space, meaning PSAC was able to push its 
scientific agenda without going against the President’s ideas. Once he decided to accelerate 
the Apollo program, however, PSAC’s ideas mismatched Kennedy’s wish for short-term 
prestige: the committee’s proposals centered around scientific research, balance, and 
international cooperation were unimpressive and lacked immediate results. This mismatch 
continued under Johnson, who had been an advocate of a prestige-oriented space program 
since Sputnik. The Vietnam War, however, changed Johnson’s stance on space leading to 
budget cuts and objections to post-Apollo programs; when PSAC decided to support NASA’s 
manned programs, it no longer aligned with Johnson’s views and thus did not increase the 
committee’s political relevance.  
 It is interesting to note that the relevance of PSAC’s advice depended on the 
president’s ideas and vision, but also for a large part on outside events. The reason PSAC 
existed in the first place was that the launch of Sputnik had prompted Eisenhower to come up 
with a suitable space policy – if it hadn’t been for the Soviet satellite, science advising would 
not have obtained such a prominent place in the White House. Also, it was the failed Bay of 
Pigs invasion and Yuri Gagarin’s flight that prompted Kennedy to make an all-out effort in 
space. Lastly, the Vietnam War forced Johnson to cut NASA’s budget even though he was a 
space enthusiast. It was change within a presidency, rather than a change of presidents, that 
impacted PSAC’s political relevance the most: Eisenhower had been president for almost five 
years when he decided he needed personal science advice, Kennedy drastically changed his 
space policy a few months into his presidency, and NASA disappeared to the back of 
Johnson’s agenda halfway his term. When it comes to PSAC’s political relevance it was not 
necessarily the president but the uncertain political environment of the presidency that 
determined the committee’s influence. 
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The science adviser’s political tact largely depended on his experience with a political 
environment and connection with the president. Eisenhower knew James Killian before he 
appointed him as science adviser; Wiesner had provided Kennedy with science advice for 
years before he moved into the White House. Both thus had easy access to the president and 
also had a good sense of what their president wanted. They also lobbied behind the scenes and 
worked with other White House aides to promote PSAC’s ideas. Donald Hornig, however, did 
not have a personal relationship with his president. The Johnson White House was also a 
highly political environment, for which Hornig did not have the necessary experience and 
toughness to push PSAC’s standpoints to the forefront. Although the political relevance of 
advice was more important than the science adviser’s tact in determining the committee’s 
influence, the adviser could change PSAC’s standing to some degree. After Kennedy’s Apollo 
decision, Wiesner kept PSAC in the loop despite the committee’s decline in relevance; 
Hornig’s lack of political tact, on the other hand, annoyed Johnson and furthered PSAC’s 
decline.  
The president’s receptiveness towards science advice depended on the president’s 
vision and management style. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy were open to hearing PSAC’s 
standpoints. Eisenhower’s hidden-hand approach of governing gave PSAC a lot of 
responsibility in shaping space policy, providing the committee with room to put forward 
their ideas. Kennedy was interested in science, liked a discussion, and preferred to obtain 
multiple points of view before making a decision, which meant PSAC maintained its position 
in the White House despite dissenting on the manned space program. Johnson, on the other 
hand, knew what he wanted and was not looking for a discussion; he also doubted PSAC’s 
allegiance to the administration, as the committee was not appointed by Johnson and did not 
share his political views. This, in combination with Hornig’s inexperience, caused PSAC’s 
relationship with the president to deteriorate and its influence to diminish.  
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The committee’s reaction to its declining influence on space varied. Overall, the 
committee was aware of its fragile position in the White House, as becomes clear from the 
committee’s effort to remain nonpartisan when the 1960 election approached. Nonetheless, it 
did not stop the scientists from being critical, especially of NASA’s work. When Kennedy 
decided to accelerate the Apollo program, Wiesner accepted that he could not stop the 
acceleration of the Apollo program, but remained critical of NASA and made sure that the 
President remained well aware of PSAC’s standpoints. Under Johnson, however, PSAC was 
hardly able to get its advice through to the President, and in an attempt to gain political 
relevance the committee eventually decided to support NASA’s manned moon programs. 
Unfortunately for PSAC, this did not increase its influence within the White House.   
This thesis only focuses on space policy from 1957 to 1969 and therefore does not 
paint the full picture of PSAC’s role in the White House. The committee provided advice on 
many other topics, and its influence in those areas might have strongly varied from its 
influence on space policy. For example, the scope of this thesis did not allow for a detailed 
analysis of PSAC’s fallout with Johnson over the Vietnam War or Nixon’s decision to abolish 
the committee, neither did it show the committee’s arms limitation efforts with the Soviet 
Union under Eisenhower or its impact on Kennedy’s environmentalist policies. Kennedy’s 
decision to put a man on the moon, however, resulted in billions of dollars and thousands of 
American scientists to work on the Apollo program; PSAC’s influence on space policy thus 
says something about scientists ability to influence the government and the government’s 
ability to influence the course of scientific research. 
So what does PSAC’s influence on space policy mean for the Forman-Kevles debate 
introduced in the historiography? Forman argues that cooperation between scientists and the 
state resulted in the funding of scientific research with promising military applications, and 
therefore took away scientists’ power to decide the course of research. Kevles, on the other 
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hand, argues that cooperation gave scientists more power to decide where funding should go. 
Whereas Forman and Kevles focus on the use of science for military applications, this thesis 
looks at science for the enhancement of prestige, but Kennedy’s decision to accelerate the 
Apollo program is similar to the dynamics described by Forman. The acceleration of the 
Apollo program meant money and scientific manpower was spent on a project that, from the 
scientists’ perspectives, did not advance the scientific field in a meaningful way. Clearly, the 
President was deciding NASA’s course, which PSAC eventually accepted for political 
reasons. There were instances in which PSAC influenced the president, for example in 
Eisenhower’s choice for NASA and in Kennedy’s decision to keep his space policy research-
oriented at the beginning of his term, but once prestige became the main objective of space 
policy PSAC’s impact was limited. 
In literature regarding the state’s use of science for military applications, scholars 
debated whether PSAC represented the interest of the state or that of the scientific community 
– but when it comes to space policy and prestige, it is clear that PSAC’s advice reflected the 
standpoints of the scientific community at large. The committee continuously advocated for 
international cooperation, rather than keeping space research secret, and warned that research 
in space should not be at the expense of other scientific research areas. The establishment of 
PSAC ensured that for the first time, the scientific community was represented in the White 
House. Regardless of PSAC’s declining impact on space policy, this was an important step for 
the scientific community. Kennedy’s decision to go to the moon might fit Forman’s analysis, 
but PSAC’s continued critique, ideas, and general involvement in space policy also 
normalized the presence of scientists in the White House. PSAC proved that it was able to 
influence the president, as was the case with Eisenhower’s choice for NASA or Kennedy 
adapting PSAC’s recommendations at the beginning of his term, which supports Kevles’ 
argument that scientists gained political power. Although in the case of the Apollo program 
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PSAC’s advice did not match the president’s needs, the science adviser’s closeness to the 
president enabled him to keep PSAC’s ideas on the table in case the political situation 
changed: when critique of the Apollo program arose, Wiesner was there to remind Kennedy 
of international cooperation in space. This fluctuation in the relevance of PSAC’s advice and 
PSAC’s inability at times to influence space policy does not mean scientists drew the short 
straw in their cooperation with the state; rather, it reflects the give-and-take reality of politics. 
PSAC’s decline in status under Johnson was much worse for the scientists because it deprived 
them of a position of influence in case the political situation changed in their favor. The 
politicization of science requires a skilled science adviser who can easily maneuver in a 
political environment and has a good relationship with the president. 
Ironically, the prestige of the moon landing directly benefitted the scientific 
community. Witnessing how Apollo 11 took off, how the Eagle landed, how Neil Armstrong 
set a foot on the moon, and how the astronauts safely returned to earth left many inspired to 
pursue a career in science. The manned moon landing caused a boom for the scientific 
community that no one on PSAC had foreseen. Just like the state funding basic research, not 
knowing what useful applications might eventually come out of it, perhaps scientists’ 
cooperation with the state can lead to benefits that scientists themselves cannot predict.  
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